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THE EX ANTE EFFECTS OF BANKRUPTCY
REFORM ON INVESTMENT INCENTIVES
ROBERT K. RASMUSSEN*
The appropriate content of bankruptcy law has become the most hotly
debated area of corporate law. The past few years have witnessed a rush
of bankruptcy scholars trying to devise new legal regimes for dealing with
firms in financial distress. A broad array of scholars have concluded that
there are substantial problems with the existing corporate reorganization
provision of the Bankruptcy Code, Chapter 11, and a number of proposals
have been made in response to these problems. These proposals range
from substantial tinkering with existing bankruptcy law' to wholesale
abandonment of any type of federal bankruptcy law.2 The more modest
proposals include a special provision designed for smaller firms, while the
more radical suggestions include having the bankruptcy court auction off
companies, eliminating federal bankruptcy law in its entirety, and allowing
firms at the time they incorporate to select from a menu of various choices
which legal regime will govern should the firm encounter financial
distress.3 These broadside attacks on extant law have not gone unnoticed.
* Visiting Professor of Law, University of Michigan Law School, Professor of Law, Vanderbilt
Law School. I would like to thank Barry Adler, Rebecca Brown, Rudi Holzhauer, Jason Johnston,
David Skeel, George Triantis, and the participants at the Workshop on Financial Distress at the
J6nk6ping International Business School, J6nk6ping, Sweden, and at The Interdisciplinary Conference
on Bankruptcy and Insolvency Theory at Washington University School of Law for comments on an
earlier draft of this article. I am grateful to the Dean's Fund at Vanderbilt Law School for financial
support.
1. See David A. Skeel, Jr., Markets, Courts, and the Brave New World of Bankruptcy Theory,
1993 Wis. L. REv. 465, 510-20 (proposing a new bankruptcy provision for small firms); Lynn M.
LoPucki, The Trouble With Chapter 11, 1993 Wis. L. REV. 729 (advocating the adoption of a new
bankruptcy procedure).
2. See Barry Adler, Financial and Political Theories of American Corporate Bankruptcy, 45
STAN. L. REv. 311 (1993); James W. Bowers, WIhither What Hits the Fan?: Murphy's Law,
Bankruptcy Theory, and the Elementary Economics of Loss Distribution, 26 GA. L. REv. 27 (1991)
[hereinafter Bowers, Loss Distribution]; James W. Bowers, Groping and Coping in the Shadow of
Murphy's Law: Bankruptcy Theory and the Elementary Economics of Failure, 88 MIcH. L. REv. 2097
(1990) [hereinafter Bowers, Bankruptcy Theory]; Michael Bradley & Michael Rosenzweig, The
Untenable Case for Chapter 11, 101 YALE L.J. 1043 (1992).
3. See Robert K. Rasmussen, Debtor's Choice: .4 Menu Approach to Corporate Bankruptcy, 71
TEx. L. REv. 51 (1992); see also Alan Schwartz, Bankruptcy Workouts and Debt Contracts, 36 J.L. &
EcoN. 595 (1993) (arguing that bankruptcy should be a default rule).
1159
Washington University Open Scholarship
1160 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [VOL. 72:1159
Defenders of the current regime have leapt to the offensive in an attempt
to beat back the calls for reform.4
Despite the ever-increasing number of articles on bankruptcy reform, the
current debate is incomplete. Much of the recent literature on bankruptcy
reform has focused on reducing the costs of financial distress once the firm
has filed for bankruptcy.' These costs can be broken down into two broad
categories. The first is the current costs, both direct and indirect, of being
in bankruptcy. The direct costs of a firm's filing for bankruptcy are the
costs of the bankruptcy proceeding itself. Lawyers, accountants, and
advisors all have to be paid. The indirect costs of a bankruptcy filing are
those costs which arise because the managers of the firm must focus on the
bankruptcy proceeding rather than on running the firm.' Scholars have
conducted studies to quantify the direct costs of bankruptcy proceedings,7
and have conjectured about the size of the indirect costs of filing for
bankruptcy.'
4. See Elizabeth Warren, The Untenable Case for Repeal of Chapter 11, 102 YALE L.J. 437
(1992) (responding to Bradley and Rosenzweig's study); Donald R. Korobkin, Rehabilitating Values:
A Jurisprudence of Bankruptcy, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 717 (1991) (reacting to the economic account of
bankruptcy law and offering an alternative normative explanation).
5. There has also been a debate over the policies of bankruptcy law between those who assert
that bankruptcy should only be concerned with promoting economic efficiency and those who assert
that bankruptcy law must also attend to the demands of social justice. See, e.g., Korobkin, supra note
4; Elizabeth Warren, Bankruptcy Policy, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 775 (1987). I have argued elsewhere that
the concerns of social justice proffered by the latter group are in fact best served by a bankruptcy
regime which promotes economic efficiency. See Robert K. Rasmussen, An Essay on Optimal
Bankruptcy Rules and Social Justice, 1994 U. ILL. L. REV. 1. Given this conclusion, this article begins
from the premise that bankruptcy law should be concerned solely with promoting economic efficiency.
6. See Lawrence A. Weiss, Bankruptcy Resolution: Direct Costs and Violation of Priority of
Claims, 27 J. FIN. ECON. 285, 288-89 (1990) (including as examples of indirect costs: increased
operating costs, a decline in the firm's competitiveness and lost sales, and a reduction in the value of
inventory); Karen H. Wruck, Financial Distress, Reorganization, and Organizational Efficiency, 27 J.
FIN. ECON. 419, 437-39 (1990) (describing further examples of indirect costs: the loss of corporate
decisionmaking power, an increase in production costs, and the loss of managerial time).
7. See Weiss, supra note 6; Julian R. Franks & Walter N. Torous, An Empirical Investigation of
U.S. Finns in Reorganization, 44 J. FIN. 747 (1989); Allan C. Eberhart et al., Security Pricing and
Deviations from the Absolute Priority Rule in Bankruptcy Proceedings, 45 J. FIN. 1457 (1990); Lynn
M. LoPucki & William C. Whitford, Bargaining Over Equity's Share in the Bankruptcy Reorganization
of Large, Publicly Held Companies, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 125 (1990).
8. See Edward I. Altman, A Further Empirical Investigation of the Bankruptcy Cost Question,
39 J. FIN. 1067, 1078 (1984) (finding that bankruptcy's total costs ranged between 11% and 17% of
firm value); David M. Cutler & Lawrence H. Summers, The Cost of Conflict Resolution and Financial
Distress: Evidence From the Texaco-Pennzoil Litigation, 19 RAND J. ECON. 157 (1988) (stating that
indirect costs are 9% of firm value); Robert H. Mnookin & Robert B. Wilson, Rational Bargaining and
Market Efficiency: Understanding Pennzoil v. Texaco, 75 VA. L. REv. 295,313-15 (1989) (discussing
the indirect costs involved in the Pennzoil v. Texaco case and querying why these costs did not force
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol72/iss3/28
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The second cost of bankruptcy on which the reform literature has
focused is the possibility that the extant bankruptcy regime makes the
incorrect decision with regard to the firm's future.9 Financial distress
forces the owners of the firm to decide whether the firm should continue
its current method of operation, change this method, or cease operations
entirely. In other words, someone, be it the shareholders, the creditors, the
managers, or the bankruptcy court, must decide how the firm's assets will
be deployed in the future. To the extent that the wrong deployment
decision is made, the value of the firm's assets are reduced. This reduction
in value entails a social cost because society as a whole bears the loss when
assets are not engaged in their most productive use.
Defenders of extant law and proponents of change have argued back and
forth over whether these two costs-the costs of being in bankruptcy and
the costs of making the wrong deployment decision-could be reduced
through a different type of bankruptcy system."t This metric has formed
the battleground of the current debate. Consider in this regard the much
discussed proposal to eliminate Chapter 11 and replace it with a system in
which a firm's failure to pay debt leads to an elimination of the interests
of the firm's outstanding equityholders.1 The architects of this proposal
argue that such a system would reduce the costs of bankruptcy proceedings
because it eliminates such proceedings in their entirety." The opponents
of this radical proposal counter that in fact federal bankruptcy law actually
reduces the costs that necessarily arise when a firm encounters financial
earlier settlement); Michelle J. White, Bankruptcy Costs and the New Bankruptcy Code, 38 J. FIN. 477
(1983) (estimating that indirect costs are ten times larger than direct costs).
9. See Douglas G. Baird, The Uneasy Case for Corporate Reorganizations, 15 J. LEGAL STUD.
127 (1986); Michelle J. White, Does Chapter 11 Save Economically Inefficient Firms?, 72 WASH. U.
L.Q. 1319 (1994); Robert Gertner & Randal C. Picker, Bankruptcy and the Allocation of Control (draft).
10. See THOMAS H. JACKSON, THE LoGic AND LIMITS OF BANKRUPTCY LAW 218-24 (1986)
(questioning whether Chapter I I should be retained); Frank H. Easterbrook, Is Corporate Bankruptcy
Efficient?, 27 J. FIN. ECON. 411 (1990) (arguing that Chapter 11 is cheaper than a regime which
auctions off insolvent firms); Robert G. Hansen & Randall S. Thomas, Auctions in Bankruptcy: Further
Analysis and Practical Guidance (draft) (disputing Easterbrook's empirical analysis); Baird, supra note
9 (arguing for an auction regime).
1I. See Adler, supra note 2; Bradley & Rosenzweig, supra note 2.
12. See Barry E. Adler, Finance's Theoretical Divide and the Proper Role of Insolvency Rules,
68 S. CAL. L. REv. 401 (forthcoming 1994) (arguing that a system of private contracts can mimic any
efficiency gains attributable to current law while eliminating the costs of running a bankruptcy
proceeding); Bradley & Rosenzweig, supra note 2, at 1078 ("Judicially-supervised corporate
reorganization imposes on society the expense of compensating those responsible for reorganization
plans (judges, lawyers, accountants, and financial advisors) and more than likely produces plans that
seriously undermine allocative efficiency.") (emphasis in original).
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distress."3 While the various proponents debate which regime best reduces
costs once the firm files for bankruptcy, most seem to agree that
postbankruptcy costs form the relevant battleground.
Virtually unnoticed in all of the current proposals to overhaul existing
law is the effect that such changes would have on firm behavior prior to
the initiation of a bankruptcy proceeding.4 This oversight omits a
significant element for analyzing the desirability of any bankruptcy system.
To see why this is so, one must look at the changes wrought by a
bankruptcy proceeding. Such a proceeding results in a change in the firm's
capital structure, most likely a change in its management (especially if the
company is publicly held)," and perhaps a significant change in its day-
to-day operations as well.
The possibility that such major events might occur affects the behavior
of those in control of the firm long before a bankruptcy petition is filed.
This conclusion is hardly surprising. Bankruptcy law determines the
allocation of a firm's assets when the firm cannot meet its obligations.
This allocation in turn affects the investment decisions of the firm outside
of bankruptcy. While recent efforts have looked at the ex ante effect of
Chapter 11,6 little attention has been paid to the ex ante effects of the
13. See Lynn M. LoPucki, Strange Visions in a Strange World: A Reply to Professors Bradley
and Rosenzweig, 91 MICH. L. REV. 79, 97-106 (1992) (noting that the transaction costs involved in
communication and coordination, achieving liquidity, providing "soft landings" for failed executives,
and providing relief from contractual default provisions make the Bradley and Rosenzweig proposal
unworkable); Elizabeth Warren, Bankruptcy Poliymaking in an Imperfect World, 92 MICH. L. REV.
336, 379-82 (1993) (noting that bankruptcy policy must be viewed in light of various market
imperfections including transaction costs and asymmetrical access to information); Warren, supra note
4, at 474-77 (citing the example of Federated Department Store's Chapter II reorganization and arguing
that, while Bradley and Rosenzweig's proposal may work in a perfect world, it is not well suited to the
actual environment in which business failures occur).
14. A few scholars have noted some of the possible ex ante effects of various bankruptcy regimes.
See Adler, supra note 2, at 330-31; Skeel, supra note I, at 476-94. Nevertheless, they have failed to
provide a comprehensive analysis of the subject.
15. Studies have consistently shown that managers are likely to lose their jobs after a firm files
for bankruptcy. See Stuart C. Gilson, Management Turnover and Financial Distress, 25 J. FIN. ECON.
241, 247 (1989) (reporting that only 29% of senior managers survive financial distress); Lynn M.
LoPucki & William C. Whitford, Corporate Governance in the Bankrnptcy Reorganization of Large,
Publicly Held Companies, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 669, 723 (1993) (finding a change in CEO during
financial distress in 91% of cases studied).
16. See Lucian A. Bebchuk & Randal C. Picker, Bankruptcy Rules, Entrenchment, and Human
Capital (draft); F.H. Buckley, The Termination Decision, 61 UMKC L. REv. 243 (1992); Robert Gertner
& David Scharfstein, A Theory of Workouts and the Effects of Reorganization Law, 46 J. FIN. 1189
(1991); Gertner & Picker, supra note 9; Susan Rose-Ackerman, Risk Taking and Ruin: Banknptcy and
Investment Choice, 20 J. LEGAL STUD. 277 (1991).
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various regimes that have been touted as replacements for extant law. This
lack of attention must be remedied. Any serious attempt to reform
bankruptcy law must take account of the relative merits of the competing
regimes. It is easy to show that any system of laws fails when compared
to an ideal world. Given the complexities of the real world, it takes little
imagination to demonstrate that the current state of affairs is not perfect.
This argument, however, engages in the nirvana fallacy: comparing a real-
world system to an unattainable ideal. 7 To avoid this fallacy, an advocate
of change must show that current bankruptcy law is worse than one of the
proposed alternatives, not that it falls short of the unattainable goal of
perfect efficiency.
In short, the interesting question is not whether bankruptcy law affects
firm behavior; it does. Rather, the interesting question is whether the
effects of current law are worse than those that would accompany a
different bankruptcy regime. Advocates for change must show that the ex
ante effects of their proposal on firm behavior are better-or at least no
worse-than the ex ante effects of current law. Failure to do so would
leave their criticisms of current law incomplete.
The importance of inquiring into the ex ante affects of bankruptcy law
cannot be understated. Saving a few dollars through a new bankruptcy
process may not be worth the cost if it would lead all firms-those that file
for bankruptcy and those that do not-to pursue inefficient courses of
action prior to reaching the bankruptcy forum. Ex post efficiency involving
the relatively few firms that file for bankruptcy should not come at the
expense of ex ante inefficiency for all firms in the economy.
Intertwined with the analysis of the ex ante effects of bankruptcy on
corporate behavior is the issue of the time at which a bankruptcy petition
is filed. It is now common wisdom that many firms in financial distress
do not file for bankruptcy) 8 The effect that bankruptcy law will have on
behavior outside of bankruptcy turns in large part on when bankruptcy
proceedings begin. A bankruptcy regime that comes into play only when
the assets of the firm are depleted has different effects than a similar
17. See Harold Demsetz, Information and Efficiency: Another Viewpoint, 12 J.L. & ECON. 1, 2
(1969); see also Ronald H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1, 43 (1960) ("Actually
very little analysis is required to show that an ideal world is better than a state of laissez faire .... But
the whole discussion is largely irrelevant ... since whatever we may have in mind as our ideal world,
... we have not yet discovered how to get to it from where we are.").
18. See Douglas G. Baird, The Reorganization of Closely Held Firms and the "Opt Out" Problem,
72 VASH. U. L.Q. 913 (1994); Stuart C. Gilson, Bankruptcy, Boards, Banks, and Blockholders, 27 J.
FiN. EcON. 355 (1990).
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regime that is invoked shortly after the firm becomes insolvent. Stated
differently, it is one thing to design an optimal bankruptcy system in
theory; it is another thing to have people actually use the system in the way
that it was intended.
To assess the ex ante costs of bankruptcy reform, Part I of this Article
begins with an examination of the literature on the agency costs in
corporations. The costs arise both with the division of ownership among
different claimholders and with the separation of ownership and control.
Implicit in this literature is the assumption that bankruptcy law respects the
contractual priority among the various claimants of the firm. It is well
known, however, that bankruptcy law in practice deviates from contractual
priority. Shareholders generally receive payouts even though the firm is
insolvent. Part II examines the way in which this deviation affects the
decisions of those charged with running the firm prior to the filing for
bankruptcy. Part III compares these effects with the effects associated with
the various proposed replacements for current law.
Part IV sets forth the implications of these results for bankruptcy reform.
The major implication is that it is impossible to determine as a categorical
matter that any of the proposed reforms has better ex ante effects than
current law. Much depends on the nature of the firm itself. The question
then becomes how this diversity in the types of firms should be addressed.
Congress could legislate different bankruptcy regimes for different firms as
some have proposed, 9 it could leave the entire matter to private con-
tract,2" or it could allow firms to sort themselves at the time the firm is
formed by adopting a bankruptcy regime that allows the owners of the firm
to select the set of bankruptcy rules that they believe best serves the firm's
needs.2
The last approach is the most desirable. While a legislature could make
gross generalizations about such needs, it is probably better to have the
individuals themselves express their preferences. Such a system does not
guarantee perfect results since the possibility that individuals will make
mistakes still exists. However, on balance, we should expect a world of
private ordering to perform better than one where government ordering is
the norm. Purely private contracting, on the other hand, creates significant
coordination and communication problems. The coordination problem is
19. See Skeel, supra note 1, at 510-20; LoPucki, supra note 1.
20. See Adler, supra note 2; Barry E. Adler, A World Without Debt, 72 WASH. U. L.Q. 811
Bowers, Loss Distribution, supra note 2; Bradley & Rosenzweig, supra note 2.
21. See Rasmussen, supra note 3.
[VOL. 72:1159
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that the various contracts that a debtor has with its various creditors must
be consistent in terms of the promised disposition of the firm. The
communication problem is that all creditors have to be told what terms
govern when the firm encounters financial distress. A "menu approach" to
bankruptcy law, by rejecting the fallacy that Congress can determine the
appropriate treatment of all firms in financial distress, and providing
standard forms to ameliorate the coordination and communication problems
that would plague a system of pure private contracts, would be a marked
improvement over the current state of affairs.
I. THE AGENCY COSTS OF DEBT AND SEPARATION OF OWNERSHIP
AND CONTROL
Common wisdom associates the initiation of a bankruptcy proceeding
with two events: the inability of the firm to pay its debts and the need to
make a decision about the future deployment of the firm's assets.2" While
these two events are correlated, they nevertheless are distinct. A solvent
firm may have its assets deployed in a less than desirable manner. Indeed,
an all-equity firm may never become insolvent regardless of how poorly it
is run.23 Conversely, an insolvent firm may be using its assets in an
optimal way. Many large firms which file under Chapter 11 eventually
reorganize with their core business intact.24 This distinction between a
firm's capital structure and its value follows directly from the Modigliani
and Miller Theorem. Thus, from the perspective of social welfare, the
proper deployment of a firm's assets is independent of its capital structure.
22. See Lemma W. Senbet, Comment: Protecting Stakeholder Interests in Bankruptcy
Reorganization, 43 TORONTO L.J. 717, 719 (1993) ("[T]here is a tendency to confound economic and
financial distress.").
23. Dean Baird notes that there are many firms which have little or no debt. See Baird, supra note
18, at 919-20.
24. LoPucki and Whitford report that in their study of 43 Chapter 11 cases involving large,
publicly held companies, 22 survived with their core business intact at the conclusion of the case. Lynn
M. LoPucki & William C. Whitford, Patterns in the Bankruptcy Reorganization of Large, Publicly Held
Companies, 78 CORNELL L. REv. 597, 602-04 (1993). See also Steven N. Kaplan, Federated's
Acquisition and Bankruptcy: Lessons and Implications, 72 WASH. U. L.Q. 1103, 1121 ("The Federated
purchase, therefore, illustrates that a highly leveraged transaction can increase value, but still be unable
to make its debt payments.").
25. Franco Modigliani & Merton H. Miller, The Cost of Capital, Corporation Finance and the
Theoiy of hnvestment, 48 AM. ECON. REv. 261, 293 (1958). The original Modigliani and Miller
Theorem ignores taxes. See Franco Modigliani & Merton H. Miller, Corporate Income Taxes and the
Cost of Capital: A Correction, 53 AM. ECON. REv. 433 (1963); see also Joseph E. Stiglitz, On the
Irrelevance of Corporate Financial Policy, 64 AM. ECON. REv. 851 (1974).
1994) 1165
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Stated differently, financial distress is different from economic distress.26
A firm that cannot pay its debts is not necessarily a firm whose assets
should be redeployed.
Despite the general acceptance of the Modigliani and Miller Theorem,27
it has been long recognized that a firm's capital structure affects the
decisions made by those in control of the firm.2" These effects stem from
two sources. The first is that the ownership interests in the firm are often
divided amongst diverse claimants. This division in ownership leads to a
difference in desires regarding the future conduct of the firm. Those
holding fixed claims against the firm would prefer a different course of
action than those holding residual claims. Holders of fixed claims may
prefer less risky investments that will insure repayment of debt, whereas
shareholders may prefer riskier projects that increase the expected value of
their shares. Traditional corporate law leaves the ultimate responsibility for
the firm's operations in its residual claimants-the shareholders.
These responsibilities are discharged in different ways in different types
of firms. In small, closely held corporations, the shareholders usually
conduct the day-to-day operations of the firm. In large, publicly held
corporations, the shareholders delegate the responsibility for the day-to-day
operation of the firm to their agents-the firm's managers. This division
between ownership and control is the second source of conflict in corporate
governance. The goals of the shareholders may differ from the goals of the
managers. Shareholders may be concerned with maximizing the value of
their shares while managers may be focused on prolonging their tenure.
These two divisions-among the owners of the firm and between the
firm's owners and its management-impose agency costs on the firm. In
other words, these divisions can create incentives for those in control of the
firm to make decisions that are not optimal from the view of the firm as a
whole. These costs have been well noted.29 Moreover, recent literature
26. See Jeremy I. Bulow & John B. Shoven, The Bankruptcy Decision, 9 BELL J. ECON. 437
(1978); Michelle J. White, Public Policy Toward Bankruptcy: Me-first and Other Priority Rules, I I
BELL J. ECON. 550 (1980); White, supra note 8.
27. See Merton H. Miller, The Modigliani-Miller Propositions After Thirty Years, 3. ECON. PERSP.,
Fall 1989, at 99, 99-100 (1988).
28. See Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior,
Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305 (1976) (arguing that debt may cause
managers to invest in negative net present value projects); Stewart C. Myers, Determinants of Corporate
Borrowing, 5 J. FIN. ECoN. 147 (1977) (stating that debt may cause managers to pass up positive net
present value projects).
29. The seminal piece in this area is that of Jensen and Meckling, supra note 28.
[VOL. 72:1159
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has attempted to explain the way in which these costs are affected by
current bankruptcy law. What has escaped attention, however, is the effect
that competing bankruptcy reform proposals would have upon these costs.
This Part of the Article examines these agency costs as a general matter,
while the next two Parts explore these costs, first in the context of existing
bankruptcy law, and second in the context of the recent calls for bankruptcy
reform.
A. The Agency Costs Associated with Debt
Financial distress is solely a function of a firm's capital structure. An
all-equity firm encounters economic distress when its revenues are less than
its expenses. It cannot, however, encounter financial distress, which is
defined as difficulty in paying its debts as they become due. This is
because an all-equity firm has no debts.30 The introduction of debt,
however, creates the possibility that the firm will encounter financial
distress. Committing to pay money in the future raises the possibility that
such funds may not be available. This inability to pay contractual
obligations may arise even if the firm is economically viable in the sense
that its revenues exceed its costs of production.3'
The effects of debt on the incentives of the owners of the firm have been
thoroughly discussed.32 It is necessary to review these effects so that the
effect of bankruptcy reform on all firms can be evaluated. An integral part
of analyzing the agency costs of debt is examining the payoff received by
the various claimants of the firm if the firm becomes insolvent. To the
extent that bankruptcy law affects these payoffs, it affects the agency costs
of debt. To measure these changes, it is necessary first to establish a
baseline. This part of the Article establishes such a baseline by setting
forth the conclusions of the literature on the agency costs of debt.
To explore the effects of debt on the way in which a firm makes
decisions concerning its future course of action, consider the following
situation. Commodore Corporation has $100 in assets. These assets
consist of cash in the bank. Commodore owes its debtholders $80. All of
30. Of course, the firm may have short-term trade debt. For the purposes of exposition, I am
assuming that the firm always has sufficient cash to pay such debt.
31. See Kaplan, supra note 24, at 1121.
32. See generally Elazer Berkovitch & E. Han Kim, Financial Contracting and Leverage Induced
Over- and Under-Investment Incentives, 45 J. FIN. 765 (1990); Richard C. Green, Investment Incentives,
Debt, and Warrants, 13 J. FIN. ECON. 115 (1984); Jensen & Meckling, supra note 28; Myers, supra
note 28.
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this debt is payable in one year and is of equal priority.33 Assume further
that Smith is the sole shareholder of Commodore, and that she runs
Commodore's day-to-day operations. This assumption allows us to focus
on the agency costs that arise when there is a division in the ownership of
the firm as opposed to those costs which flow from the separation of
ownership and control. For the moment, also assume that Smith is risk
neutral.
Under these assumptions, the current value of Commodore's debt is $80.
With the money in the bank, Commodore's debtholders are assured full
repayment. From the perspective of Commodore's debtholders, however,
leaving the responsibility for running the firm in the hands of Smith
subjects them to the risk that she will take actions which decrease the value
of the debt. Such devaluation can occur in four ways: dividend payment,
asset substitution, claim dilution, and underinvestment.34
Dividend payment is the most obvious way in which shareholders can
transfer wealth to themselves from the debtholders. In our example, Smith
could have Commodore declare a $100 dividend. Such action would
transfer $80 in value from the debtholders to Smith. Before the payment,
Smith's interest in Commodore is worth $20 and the debtholders' interest
is worth $80. After the dividend, Smith's interest increases to $100 while
that of the debtholders falls to $0.
The risk of dividend payment does not loom large in an analysis of the
ex ante effects of bankruptcy law. As an initial matter, nonbankruptcy law
prohibits the payment of dividends by an insolvent firm.35 These laws are
not considered to be wholly effective in protecting debtholders from the
harm posed by such payments.36 However, to the extent that these laws
provide inadequate protection to debtholders, the debtholders can protect
themselves against dividend payments that devalue their debt. Dividend
payment is an observable and verifiable event. It is therefore easy to write
a contract prohibiting such action.37 Indeed, such contractual prohibitions
33. For the sake of simplicity, I assume both that the rate of interest on the debt and the discount
rate are zero.
34. See Jensen & Meckling, supra note 28, at 333-37; Clifford W. Smith, Jr. & Jerold B. Warner,
On Financial Contracting: An Analysis of Bond Covenants, 7 J. FIN. ECON. 117, 118-19 (1979); AmIIR
BARNEA ET AL., AGENCY PROBLEMS AND FINANCIAL CONTRACTING 31-40 (1985).
35. See, e.g., CAL. CORP. CODE § 501 (West 1994); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 170(a) (1983); N.Y.
Bus. CORP. LAw § 510(a) (Consol. 1994).
36. BAYLESS MANNING & JAMES J. HANKS, LEGAL CAPITAL 65-67 (3d ed. 1990).
37. For a survey of such restrictions, see Avner Kalay, Stockholder-Bondholder Conflict and
Dividend Constraints, 10 J. FIN. ECON. 211, 214-18 (1982).
[VOL. 72:1159
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are commonplace. Given these statutory and contractual constraints on
dividend payment, there is little room left for bankruptcy law to affect this
type of behavior. For this reason, the remainder of this Article does not
focus on this cost of debt.
The second way in which shareholders can transfer wealth to themselves
from existing debtholders is to have the firm issue new debt. To see how
this action reduces the value of the existing debt, consider again the
example of Commodore Corporation. The initial interest rate on the $80
in debt that Commodore has issued was based on a certain likelihood that
the company would repay the loan. If Smith were to increase
Commodore's leverage by having it issue new debt which was not
subordinated to the existing debt, Commodore would become less likely to
pay off the preexisting debt.
For example, assume that Smith had Commodore borrow an additional
$100, and that this loan has priority over the preexisting debt. To see the
effect of this new debt on the old debt, further assume that Smith is
presented with two projects, each of which would cost $100 and each of
which would pay either $120 or $80, with each payoff being equally likely.
Had the new loan not been made, Smith could have invested in only one
of these projects and the debtholders would still have been assured full
repayment. After the loan, however, Smith can invest in both projects.
This increases the expected return to Smith. Had Smith only invested in
the first project, the value of her shares would have been $20.3" If she
invests in both projects, however, the value of her interest rises to $25. 39
This increase in the value of Smith's holding comes at the expense of the
debtholders. While they still will be paid in full 75% of the time, 25% of
the time they will only receive $60. Thus, their claim against Commodore
would now be worth $75. By issuing new debt, Smith has increased her
expected return at the expense of the existing debtholders.
As with increased dividends, the threat of decreasing the value of
existing debt by issuing new debt can be handled by contract. Lending
contracts commonly restrict the borrower's ability to take on new debt.
40
This ability to contract against issuance of new debt leaves little room for
38. This is because she will either receive $0 or $40, with each possibility being equally likely.
39. One quarter of the time she receives $60 ($240 - $180), half of the time she receives $20
($200 - ISO), and one quarter of the time she receives $0.
40. See Alan Schwartz, A Theory of Loan Priorities, 18 J. LEGAL STUD. 209, 216-18 (1989)
(noting that lenders routinely constrain the debtor's ability to borrow in the future).
116919941
Washington University Open Scholarship
1170 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
legal intervention.4 There may be limits on the extent to which parties
are able to write a contract which provides the optimum level of protection
for existing debtholders while still allowing the firm to borrow additional
funds when necessary.42 But this problem is unaffected by the content of
bankruptcy law. To the extent that contractual restrictions are enforced
prior to bankruptcy, the effect of bankruptcy law on future behavior will
be minimal. While bankruptcy law overrides contractual restrictions on
future borrowing,43 this rejection of the firm's contractual obligations
takes place only after the firm has filed for bankruptcy. Given this, it is
hard to see how bankruptcy law affects the drafting of these contractual
provisions in the first instance. For this reason, the remainder of this
Article ignores this aspect of the agency cost of debt.
The remaining two agency costs of debt-asset substitution and
underinvestment-are affected by bankruptcy law. Asset substitution
occurs when a firm exchanges assets with a stable value for assets with a
fluctuating value.' Shareholders stand to gain from such substitution
because, as the residual claimants of the firm, they reap the gain if the new
asset increases in value, whereas the debtholders will bear some of the loss
if the asset decreases in value. In our example, Smith would have an
incentive to convert Commodore's cash into a new asset that promises her
a higher potential return. In the extreme case, she would go to Las Vegas
and put the $100 on black. Such action is in Smith's interest because it
exchanges an asset that is worth $20 to her for an asset that, because it will
pay her either $0 or $120, with each outcome being equally likely (at least
if we ignore the green numbers), is worth $60 to her. In this example,
Smith transfers wealth from the debtholders to herself by exchanging an
asset with a low variance in payout for an asset with equal value but a
higher variance in payout.
It is important to note, however, that while asset substitution may
decrease the value of the outstanding debt, it does not necessarily decrease
social welfare. Most, if not all, investments entail risk. Few endeavors in
life are "sure things." Moreover, investors understand that the firms in
which they invest are going to put their money at risk. From a societal
41. Id. See also Smith & Warner, supra note 34, at 136-37.
42. For various solutions to this problem, see Berkovitch & Kim, supra note 32; Clifford W.
Smith, Jr. & L. Macdonald Wakeman, Determinants of Corporate Leasing Policy, 40 J. FIN. 895
(1990); Ren6 M. Stulz & Herb Johnson, An Analysis of Secured Debt, 14 J. FIN. ECON. 501 (1985).
43. 11 U.S.C. § 364 (1988).
44. See Smith & Warner, supra note 34, at 118-19.
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point of view, problems arise only when asset substitution leads sharehold-
ers to invest in projects that have a negative net present value.
As an illustration of how such a situation might occur, consider what
would happen in our example if Smith were presented with the following
investment opportunity. For $100 Smith can undertake a project that, in
a year's time, will pay either $180 or $0, with both outcomes being equally
likely. This project has a net present value of -$10. Nevertheless, Smith
has an incentive to undertake this project. By forgoing the project, Smith
would receive $20. By accepting the project, however, she has an expected
payout of $50. Thus, Smith would invest in the project even though, from
a societal perspective, the project should not be undertaken.
The final agency cost of debt is underinvestment. Underinvestment
occurs when a firm's capital structure causes it to bypass projects that have
a positive net present value. To demonstrate this effect, assume that
Commodore Corporation still has $100 in assets, but that its liabilities have
increased to $120. Consider what would happen under these facts if Smith
were presented with a project that costs $100 and will pay either $115 or
$95 in a year's time. This project has a net present value of $5. Neverthe-
less, Smith has no incentive to undertake the project. Even if the project
is successful, she will not benefit. She would rather wait for the opportuni-
ty to invest in some other project that has the potential to produce a profit
in excess of $20.
This underinvestment effect is magnified as the firm falls deeper into
financial distress. When the firm's assets equal its liabilities, shareholders
will focus simply on the payoffs that exceed the present value of the assets.
All downside risks are borne by the debtholders. As financial distress
deepens, shareholders require an even larger potential gain to induce them
to undertake the project. Thus, the larger the insolvency of the firm, the
more likely it is that the firm will forgo projects which have a positive net
present value.
A note of caution is in order at this point. It is easy to overstate the
underinvestment problem. While those in control of the firm may, at times,
have an incentive to engage in asset substitution that decreases social
welfare, they do not have an incentive to engage in underinvestment.
Rather, they simply have no incentive to undertake certain projects that
would increase social welfare. Thus, any increase in the incentive to
undertake such projects will create an overall incentive for such action. For
example, a firm may well undertake a project that brings it closer to
solvency because it may then be able to invest in other projects which will
subsequently make it solvent. In our example, Smith might undertake the
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project hypothesized above if she expects to be able to invest in a similar
project next year. This is because the second project will return Commo-
dore to solvency. Thus, for underinvestment to occur, it must be that the
entire range of projects that the firm has available are not enough to restore
the firm to financial health.
Private contracts are insufficient to guard fully against the risks inherent
in the issuance of debt. To be sure, debtholders certainly know the ways
in which a firm, through its choice of investment projects, can transfer
value from them to the shareholders. Consequently, they often include in
their debt agreements covenants designed to provide some degree of
protection. For example, security agreements often guard against some of
the problems of asset substitution.4" These contractual prohibitions,
however, cannot eliminate the problems of asset substitution and
underinvestment. The problem is one of information. In a world of perfect
information and zero transaction costs, all socially efficient projects would
be undertaken. Shareholders would be able to engage in asset substitution
where it increases social welfare because they could offer debtholders
sufficient payment to consent to the substitution under such circumstances,
since the expected gain to the shareholders exceeds the expected loss to the
debtholders. However, shareholders could not offer such payment in the
case of socially inefficient projects. As to the underinvestment problem,
the debtholders would be able to offer sufficient payment to the sharehold-
ers to invest in the project. These conclusions are, of course, straightfor-
ward applications of the Coase Theorem. In the real world, however,
debtholders do not know what investment choices shareholders will be
faced with in the future. Thus, it is unrealistic to expect that contracts can
specify which projects should be undertaken and which ones should be
rejected.
This problem cannot be solved by writing a contractual term that requires
the shareholders to maximize firm value. When the shareholders (whom
I am assuming are actually running the firm) receive information regarding
future opportunities, this information may not be observable to the
debtholders. Moreover, the firm's operating results are not a reliable
indicator of whether the shareholders chose value-maximizing projects.
Bad operating results simply are not conclusive proof of manager
misbehavior. Most projects carry a risk that they will not be able to cover
45. See George G. Triantis, Secured Debt Under Conditions ofinperfect Information, 21 J. LEGAL
STUD. 225, 247-48 (1992).
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their costs. Thus, project failure may be the result of management's choice
of bad projects, or the result of unfavorable external factors. Moreover,
with regard to the underinvestment problem, debtholders do not observe the
projects that managers choose to forgo. Thus, it is unrealistic to expect that
vague contractual provisions coupled with debtholder monitoring will fully
solve the asset substitution and underinvestment problems.
To the extent that debtholders cannot fully mitigate the risks inherent in
issuing debt, they will price the risk by raising the interest rate on the debt.
While managers thus have an incentive at the time of the initial loan to
limit their opportunities to extract value from debtholders, it is impossible
to write a fully contingent contract which ensures that no such behavior
will occur. Any residual agency costs will raise the price of debt.
B. The Agency Costs of the Separation of Ownership and Control
To this point, only the agency costs associated with debt have been
considered. In addition to these costs, the organizational structure of a firm
may create an agency cost due to the separation of ownership and control.
The preceding analysis simply looked at the incentive effects on sharehold-
ers, and assumed that shareholders controlled the investment decisions of
the firm. Yet in many companies, certainly in most publicly held
companies, shareholders employ managers to run the day-to-day operations
of the firm. These managers may own shares of the firm, but they do not
own a significant portion of the outstanding stock. While these managers
are legally the agents of the shareholders, they do not necessarily act in the
best interest of the shareholders.
In a widely held firm, shareholders want managers to pursue strategies
that maximize the shareholders' wealth. In other words, they want
managers to be perfect agents. Shareholders prefer such action even if it
entails some risk of nonpayment, because they can diversify away such
risk.46 Managers, on the other hand, have no ability to diversify away
firm-specific risk. To the extent that the payoffs to managers turn on their
receipt of salary, managers have an incentive to entrench themselves.
Financial distress often results in managers losing their jobs.47 Managers
thus prefer decisions that protect them from the consequences of such
distress, even though such decisions may not increase the value of the firm.
46. See FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF
CORPORATE LAW 29-30, 121-23 (1991).
47. See supra note 15.
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When looking at investment choices, managers equate liquidation of the
firm with personal financial ruin.48 While shareholders are unconcerned
with the value of the firm once the firm becomes insolvent, managers are
unconcerned with firm value once the firm's condition deteriorates to the
point at which it must be liquidated. The way in which this concern affects
the investment choices that managers make depends on the way in which
one conceptualizes their desire to avoid financial ruin. 9 If one views
managers as solely concerned with avoiding liquidation, it follows that
managers will choose less risky projects when the firm has little chance of
being liquidated, but will invest in more risky projects when the firm is
facing a high probability of liquidation.5
Matters are less clear if one views managers as concerned with both
minimizing the chance of firm liquidation and maximizing the value of the
firm if it does survive. Under this view, managers of an insolvent firm will
choose risky projects with high variances because this maximizes both the
chance for firm continuation and the value of the firm if it is still in
business. When the firm is solvent, however, managers face a tradeoff.
Risky projects may maximize firm value if they succeed, but these projects
also raise the chances of liquidation. Conversely, safe projects may ensure
the continued viability of the firm, but fail to maximize the firm's value.5"
The way in which managers assess these tradeoffs depends, to a great
extent, on the relative weights that the managers assign to firm failure on
one hand, and maximizing the value of the firm if it remains in business
on the other.
Managers are ultimately responsible for the deployment of the firm's
assets. Their deployment decision depends on the information that they
possess, the extent to which their discretion is controlled through positive
law and contractual covenants, and the alternatives that they have in terms
of their own future prospects. These three factors often operate simulta-
neously. For example, few would dispute the notion that the firm's
managers are the in best position to obtain information about the proper
deployment of the firm's assets. Managers have information regarding
these assets-such as their productivity and their ease of adaptability-that
others probably lack. Yet, the managers may not have the appropriate
incentives to obtain a sufficient amount of information regarding new uses
48. Rose-Ackerman, supra note 16, at 282-83.
49. See id. at 286-92.
50. Id. at 287-90.
51. Id. at 290.
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for these assets. Managers do have some incentive to look for new
projects-for example, where their wage is tied to some measure of firm
performance. But managers will probably not look for projects that
displace them. Few managers will voluntarily decide to liquidate the
company, or seek to merge with another firm, if it entails losing their jobs.
This reluctance exists even if such action would increase the value of the
firm's assets. Finally, even if the managers do discover a new opportunity
of which they wish to take advantage, loan covenants might prevent the
action.
The solvent firm uses a number of mechanisms to police these problems.
Perhaps most importantly, the takeover market constrains managers. 2
Poor managerial performance can lead to a hostile tender offer. Relational
investing also may limit managerial opportunism. 3 Such investing occurs
where a single shareholder buys a large block of a firm's shares with the
intent to be a long-term investor in the firm. By having such a stake, the
relational investor overcomes many of the problems that tend to cause
shareholders to be passive investors. 4  Debt contracts place limits on
managerial risk taking,5 and creditors often monitor the performance of
the firm. Golden parachutes may induce managers to undertake firm-
maximizing projects by insulating managers from ruin if the project turns
out badly. 6
These checks on managerial behavior vary from firm to firm. For
example, shareholders of a large firm want the firm to take risky invest-
ments. Thus, the shareholders may give the managers options tied to the
extent to which the firm's growth exceeds some benchmark. In a small,
closely held firm, where the shareholders are not so diversified, there is less
desire on the part of shareholders for risk. In such a situation, the
52. See EASTERBROOK & FiSCHEL, supra note 46, at 171-74; Henry G. Manne, Mergers and the
Market for Corporate Control, 73 J. POL. ECON. 110 (1965).
53. See Ian Ayres & Peter Cramton, Relational Investing and Agency Theory, 15 CARDOZO L.
REV. 1033 (1994). For the potential risks that relational investing poses, see Edward B. Rock,
Controlling the Dark Side of Relational Investing, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 987 (1994).
54. Ayres & Cramton, supra note 53, at 1035-36. For an argument that shareholder passivity is
beneficial, see Peter V. Letsou, Shareholder Voice and the Market for Corporate Control, 70 WASH.
U. L.Q. 755 (1992).
55. See Smith & Warner, supra note 34 (explaining that debt covenants may place restrictions on
the firm's investment policy by explicitly noting what projects the firm may undertake); Kalay, supra
note 37 (noting that debt contracts may set constraints on shareholders' abilities to set dividend
payments).
56. See Ellie G. Harris, Antitakeover Measures, Golden Parachutes, and Target Firm Shareholder
Melfare, 21 RAND J. ECON. 614 (1990).
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shareholders may closely monitor the activity of the managers to ensure the
safety of their investment.
The optimal level of constraints on managerial behavior differs from firm
to firm. The agency problems associated with a large, publicly held firm
are different from those which exist in a small, closely held company. As
a general matter, the optimal level of constraints is an amalgam of
mandatory and suppletory law. As with the agency costs of debt, it is
impossible to write a fully contingent contract that completely eliminates
agency costs. The shareholders again encounter problems, both in
identifying in advance the course of action that they want the managers to
take and in observing the actual decisions made by the managers. These
problems ensure that the managers will not act as perfect agents of the
shareholders.
II. THE Ex ANTE EFFECT OF CURRENT BANKRUPTCY LAW
Bankruptcy law undoubtedly affects the agency costs associated both
with debt and with the division of ownership and control. Regarding the
costs associated with debt, current law affects the incentives regarding asset
substitution and underinvestment; in relation to the costs associated with the
separation of ownership and control, it affects the managers' preference for
risk. These effects stem from the fact that bankruptcy law determines the
payoffs to the various claimants of the firm upon insolvency. These
payoffs include the cash that the creditors may receive at the end of the
bankruptcy proceeding or their newly acquired interest in the reorganized
firm. Bankruptcy law is thus a mandatory term of every contract between
a debtor and its creditors. 7 It states that under certain conditions, the
shortfall in the debtor's assets will be distributed under a set scheme, and
that this distribution will be made according to a certain procedure. Given
this fact, the various investors in the firm will structure their behavior in
anticipation of these events. Indeed, the agency costs of asset substitution,
underinvestment, and managerial entrenchment all stem from the payouts
which the various parties receive when a given project fails.
To assess these effects, however, a baseline is needed. The above
discussion of the agency costs of debt is premised on the assumption that
debt enjoys full priority over equity. Stated differently, the traditional
analysis of the agency costs of debt and of the separation of ownership and
control assumes a bankruptcy regime under which contractual priority is
57. Rasmussen, supra note 3, at 55-68.
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respected. This priority means that when a firm is insolvent, the sharehold-
ers take nothing. The Bankruptcy Code as written shares this assumption.
According to the Code, if the firm is liquidated, the shareholders can
recover only if all creditors are paid in full, including interest. If the
firm is reorganized, existing shareholders can participate in the reorganiza-
tion only if all other parties are either paid in full, with interest, or consent
to less than full payment. 9
The Code's mandate of respecting contractual priority, however, is not
borne out in practice. As an empirical matter, it is often the case that, both
in and outside of bankruptcy, debtholders are not paid in full even though
equity retains an interest in the firm." The failure of equity to lose its
entire investment when the business fails results from procedural
protections that equity receives under the Code.6 Because the losses of
financial distress are shared in this fashion, contractual priorities, which
seem absolute on paper, are not absolute in practice.
It is one thing to say that loss sharing in bankruptcy occurs; it is another
to determine whether it is normatively desirable. Such a determination
depends, in part, on the relative costs of regimes based on full priority and
those based on some notions of loss sharing. This Part of the Article
explores how a legal regime that incorporates loss sharing changes the ex
ante behavior of the firm as compared to a regime that respects contractual
priority. This undertaking is necessary because it describes the effect that
existing bankruptcy law has on ex ante behavior. It thus provides a
baseline for assessing the effects that would occur were Congress to adopt
one of the various proposed reforms of the Bankruptcy Code. Moreover,
the comparison between allowing for loss sharing and respecting contractu-
al priority is enlightening because many of the proposed reforms that have
been suggested-e.g., elimination of Chapter 11 and institution of a
mandatory auction-are designed to ensure that contractual priority remains
intact.
A. Loss Sharing's Effect on Investment
Existing bankruptcy law affects the incentives of the shareholders to
either engage in asset substitution or to forgo investments with a positive
58. See I1 U.S.C. § 726 (1988).
59. 11 U.S.C. § 1129 (1988).
60. See sources cited supra note 7.
61. For a list of the forces in the Bankruptcy Code that contribute to loss sharing, see Barry E.
Adler, Bankruptcy and Risk Allocation, 77 CORNELL L. REv. 439, 446-55 (1992).
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net present value. As to asset substitution, extant law sometimes increases
and sometimes decreases the incentive for such substitution. This effect
occurs because current bankruptcy law tends to ensure that shareholders
receive an interest in the firm's assets even when the debtholders are not
paid in full. Repeated empirical studies have found that equityholders often
receive part of the reorganized firm even though creditors do not receive
full payment on their debts. Thus, by protecting shareholders' interests in
the firm from being totally eliminated in the event of insolvency,
bankruptcy law at times increases the value of asset substitution to
shareholders.6'
To see this effect, recall our earlier situation in which Commodore
Corporation has $100 in assets, all of which are cash, and unsecured debt
of $80. Smith, the sole shareholder and manager of Commodore, is
presented with a project costing $100, which eventually will pay either
$115 or $75, with both prospects being equally likely. From the perspec-
tive of social welfare, the project should not be undertaken because it has
a net present value of -$5. Stated differently, if Commodore had no
outstanding debt, Smith would not undertake the project. The same result
obtains when Commodore has $80 in debt, and contractual priority is
respected. In this situation, Smith's equity interest absent investment in the
project is $20. If she invests in the project, and the law adheres to
contractual priority, the value of her equity interest would fall to $17.50.
Accordingly, she would decline to pursue the project.
This result changes, however, once there is a sufficient level of
redistribution in bankruptcy. If bankruptcy law gave Smith more than $5
due to her equity interest in Commodore, she would undertake the project.
Absent investment, her equity interest is still worth $20. If she undertakes
the investment and it succeeds, her payoff would be $35; if the investment
fails, she would receive the share allocated to her by bankruptcy law. Once
this share exceeds $5, Smith's equity interest is increased by undertaking
this investment even though it has a negative net present value. Thus,
redistribution in bankruptcy creates additional incentives for asset
substitution.
The effect of bankruptcy redistribution is not entirely negative, however.
In some situations loss sharing in bankruptcy may militate against the
incentives to invest in net negative value projects. Consider the following
scenario. Commodore Corporation once again has assets of $100, but now
62. Id. at 473-74.
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has debt of $120. Smith, Commodore's sole shareholder and manager, is
presented with a project that costs $100. The payoffs from the project are
either $140 or $0, with both being equally likely to occur. Thus, the
project has a net present value of -$30 and, from society's standpoint,
should not go forward. Absent redistribution in bankruptcy, however,
Smith would undertake the project. The value of her equity interest before
the investment is zero; after the investment, the net present value of her
equity interest is $10.
Bankruptcy loss sharing can alter Smith's incentives so that she does not
invest in the project. Smith's incentive to undertake the project stems from
the fact that, absent investment, her equity interest is worthless. Bankrupt-
cy redistribution changes this scenario. From Smith's point of view, each
dollar that bankruptcy redistribution gives her when the firm is insolvent
increases the value of her equity interest absent investment by one dollar.
This redistribution, however, does not produce a similar increase if Smith
undertakes the project at issue. The project succeeds fifty percent of the
time and, in the solvent company, contractual priority is respected. Thus,
in the case under consideration, for each dollar which bankruptcy law
redistributes, Smith's equity interest if she undertakes the project increases
only fifty cents. Stated differently, if the project succeeds, Smith loses the
benefit of bankruptcy redistribution. Absent bankruptcy redistribution,
Smith's equity interest is worth $10 if she undertakes the project and $0 if
she declines the investment. Thus, once the level of redistribution in
bankruptcy rises to more than $20, Smith would not invest in the project.
At that point her equity interest is worth more if she forgoes investment in
the negative net present value project.
These countervailing effects of loss sharing on the problem of asset
substitution turn on whether the firm is solvent at the time the investment
decision is made. If the firm is solvent-i.e., the equity interest would
have a positive value if the firm were liquidated today-loss sharing tends
to promote asset substitution. This effect occurs because loss sharing has
no effect on the current value of the equity interest. However, loss sharing
does increase the value of the equity interest if the project is undertaken,
because it reduces the loss to the shareholders if the project turns out
poorly without diminishing the return to shareholders if the project
succeeds. In contrast, when the firm is insolvent, loss sharing in effect
gives value to the shareholders for what would be, absent investment, their
otherwise worthless claim on the firm. Shareholders have to risk this value
if they engage in asset substitution.
While these two effects point in opposite directions, they are not of equal
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magnitude. This is because when the firm is solvent, loss sharing only
affects the shareholders' return if they take the investment. When the firm
is insolvent, on the other hand, loss sharing affects both the value of the
equity interest absent investment and the value of that interest if the
investment is made. To assess the relative magnitude of these competing
effects, it is useful to quantify them. To do so, assume that we have a firm
with assets worth A, and debt worth D. The firm is presented with an
opportunity to invest in a project at cost C. This project will pay either v.
or vL, with the probability of vH occurring being p and the probability of vL
occurring being (l-p). Assume further that 0 < vL < D - A + C. This last
assumption implies that the firm is insolvent if vL occurs, and that the ex
post value of the project, not considering its costs, will never be negative.
Were bankruptcy law to respect contractual priority, the firm would invest
in the project when
p(vH - C - D + A) > max(0, A - D) (1)
The left side of the inequality is the expected value of the shareholders'
interest if the project is undertaken,63 while the right side is the value of
their interest without the investment. In other words, Inequality (1) simply
states that the firm will undertake a project when the shareholders' expected
payoff under the project exceeds the current value of their equity interest.
As noted above, asset substitution is neither inherently beneficial nor
costly from society's point of view. To determine whether bankruptcy
law's effect on the incentives to engage in asset substitution are beneficial
or not, we have to specify which investments should be undertaken from
a societal perspective. From this point of view, an investment is socially
efficient if the overall expected return from the project exceeds its costs.
Such projects have a positive net present value. This situation exists where
pvH + (1-p)vL - C > 0 (2)
To compare a bankruptcy system which respects contractual priority to
the present system, we need to specify when investment occurs under the
latter regime. We know that loss sharing exists under current law as it is
applied. Because this sharing is not explicitly endorsed in the Code, it is
not uniform across all cases.' This disparity, which has little to com-
63. Because contractual priority is respected, there is no payoff to the shareholders if the project
yields vL.
64. For the extent of variation in loss sharing in large, publicly held companies, see LoPucki &
Whitford, supra note 7, at 142 (reporting that equity received between 0 and 57.7% of total value given
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mend it, may arise because of differing judicial attitudes toward the amount
of control the shareholders should have during a bankruptcy proceeding, or
because the various claimants to the firm have differing levels of patience
in the negotiating process.65 No one advocates that the existence and
degree of loss sharing attributable to bankruptcy law should turn on such
factors. Nevertheless, those in control of the firm will estimate what they
would receive in a bankruptcy proceeding. They might do so in one of
three ways.
First, they might attempt to anticipate which judge would handle the case
if the firm files for bankruptcy and the relative impatience of all the
potential claimants. Such a process seems unlikely. The costs of learning
which judges might be assigned to their case, and the predilections of these
judges, seem high. Moreover, it may be difficult to anticipate who will be
claimants in the event of insolvency and to estimate the relevant level of
impatience. Such costly fine-tuning does not seem like a sensible
approach.
The two other ways in which the managers of the firm may anticipate
bankruptcy redistribution seem more realistic. On one hand, they might
imagine that they would receive a set amount upon insolvency regardless
of the value of the firm. Alternatively, they might anticipate that they
would receive a percentage of the firm's remaining assets. Both rules of
thumb have the benefit of being relatively easy to administer. For this
paper, I assume that the latter regime is in place. The latter conception
better comports with existing practice because the distributions to
shareholders seem to turn on the size of the firm.
Thus, under a loss sharing regime, the equityholders of the firm receive
a percentage, S, of the value of the firm's assets, A. The firm will now
invest in the project if
max[p(vH - C + A - D), Sp(vH - C + A)] + (1-p)S(vL + A - C) >
max(SA, A - D) (3)
The left side of the inequality is the payoff to the shareholders if the
investment is undertaken. It differs from Inequality (1) in one respect; the
shareholders receive a payoff if the firm is insolvent. While insolvency is
guaranteed if the project performs poorly, success does not necessarily
to unsecured creditors and equity).
65. On this latter point, see Douglas G. Baird & Randal C. Picker, A Simple Noncooperative
Bargaining Model of Corporate Reorganizations, 20 J. LEGAL STUD. 311, 337-38 (1991).
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imply that the firm will be solvent. In the case of success, whether or not
the firm ends up solvent turns on the payoff that success brings and the
extent to which the firm was insolvent prior to the investment. The right
side of the inequality is the payoff to the shareholders if the firm does not
undertake the project. It differs from Inequality (1) in that it provides that
the shareholders receive a positive payoff even when the firm is insolvent.
As discussed above, the effects of risk sharing turn on whether the firm
is insolvent when it is deciding whether to undertake a project. Consider
first the situation where the firm is solvent-i.e. absent investment, the
shareholders receive the payoff A -D. In this situation, bankruptcy sharing
will result in asset substitution that otherwise would not have occurred
when Inequality (3) holds but Inequality (1) does not. In terms of the
model, additional asset substitution occurs where
p(vH - C - D + A) <A - D
and
p(vH - C - D + A) + (1-p)S(vL + A - C) > A - D
These two inequalities can be combined to yield:
p(vH - C - D + A) + (l-p)S(vL + A - C) > A - D > p(v, - C - D + A)
Subtracting p(vH - C - D + A) from this inequality, we get
(1-p)S(vL + A - C) > A - D - p(vH- C- D + A) > O (4)
In other words, bankruptcy sharing leads to additional asset substitution
when, with sharing, the expected payoff of investment failure to the
shareholders exceeds the current equity cushion minus the expected payoff
of success. This latter part of the inequality must be greater than zero. If
it is not-in other words, if the expected payoff to the shareholders for
project success exceeds the equity cushion-then investment would occur
in both regimes. Thus, additional asset substitution is more likely to occur
in a solvent firm under a bankruptcy sharing regime as the percentage of
the firm that the shareholders retain increases, the value of the remaining
assets when the project turns out poorly increases, and the payoff to the
shareholders if the project is a success increases. Additional asset
substitution decreases, however, as the equity cushion increases.
This additional asset substitution is socially inefficient. The additional
substitution would only be efficient to the extent that there is an
underinvestment problem in the solvent firm. If the solvent firm invests in
all projects that have a positive net present value, any additional investment
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must be in projects that have a negative net present value. Consider first
the situation in which the solvent firm, if its assets remain in the present
configuration, has no possibility of becoming insolvent. This would occur
when the firm has enough cash on hand to pay all of its outstanding debt.
It is clear in this case that the firm would invest in all positive net present
value projects.6 6 It stands to reap all of the gain from such projects while,
to the extent that there is any debt in the firm, suffering only part of the
loss. Since the expected value of the potential gains exceeds that of the
potential losses, the firm will not pass up a project that has a positive net
present value. Thus, to the extent that loss sharing increases the firm's
incentive to undertake projects by lessening the loss to the shareholders if
the project fails, loss sharing increases investment in socially inefficient
projects.
The same result occurs when the firm is solvent but has a possibility of
becoming insolvent if its assets remain in their present configuration. We
can express this situation by envisioning two states of the world: one where
the firm ends up solvent, and the other where the firm ends up insolvent.
In the former situation, the shareholders would receive all of the gains from
any positive net present value project in which they have invested. In other
words, investing in a positive net present value project increases the value
of the shareholders' interest should the firm end up solvent. Such an
investment might or might not increase the value of the shareholders'
interest in the event of insolvency; whether it does or does not depends on
the extent of the firm's potential insolvency and the payoffs of the project.
But even when the new investment adds nothing to the shareholders'
interest in the event of insolvency, the shareholders would still undertake
the investment. While they gain nothing should insolvency occur, they also
do not lose anything. By investing in the positive net present value project,
the value of the shareholders' interest increases if the firm remains solvent,
and remains the same (zero) in the event of insolvency. Thus, the
shareholders of the solvent firm would always undertake investments with
a positive net present value even though there is no loss sharing if the firm
ends up insolvent. Thus, any additional investments that loss sharing
induces a solvent firm to make must be in projects which have a negative
net present value.
66. As Alan Schwartz correctly notes, this assumes that the firm has sufficient funds to finance
the project itself. See Alan Schwartz, The Absolute Priority Rule and the Firm's Investment Policy, 72
WASH. U. L.Q. 1213 (1994). If the firm has to seek outside financing, however, it may not be able to
invest in all positive net present value projects. See id. at 1215.
1994] 1183
Washington University Open Scholarship
1184 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
To demonstrate this in terms of the model, return to Inequality (1), which
specifies when a firm invests in a project absent loss sharing in bankruptcy.
When the firm is solvent, we have investment when
p(vH - C + A - D) > A - D
Subtracting A-D from this, we get
p(vH-C-D+A)-A+D> 0
Rearranging the left side of the inequality, we get:
p(vH - C) + (l-p) (D -A) > 0 (5)
Recall that investment is efficient when
pVH + (1-p)L - C > 0 (6)
For the solvent firm to engage in a socially inefficient investment,
Inequality (5) would have to hold but Inequality (6) would not. In terms
of the model, the following would have to be true:
p(VH- C) + (1-p)(D - A) > PVH + (1-p)VL - C
This inequality can be reduced to
-vL >A - D - C
But this inequality cannot hold since we already know that vL <A - D - C,
and vL >_ 0. Thus, the additional investments attributable to loss sharing in
bankruptcy must be in socially inefficient projects. Consequently, from an
ex ante perspective, loss sharing in bankruptcy has a deleterious effect on
the behavior of the solvent firm.
Of course, not all firms outside of bankruptcy are solvent. Insolvency
does not lead to the immediate filing of a bankruptcy petition. Thus, to
assess the ex ante effect of current bankruptcy law, it is necessary to
consider the effects that the law has on an insolvent firm. In a world
without bankruptcy sharing, the investment condition for the insolvent firm
is
p(vH-C+A-D)> 0
In other words, so long as there is any chance for the project to return an
insolvent firm to solvency, it is in the interest of the shareholders to invest
in it. Shareholders of the insolvent firm thus ignore the costs of project
failure. Therefore, it is readily apparent that strict contractual priority
encourages investments in projects that are socially inefficient.
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This problem of asset substitution by the insolvent firm is ameliorated
by a bankruptcy regime that incorporates loss sharing. When such a system
is in place, recall from Inequality (3) that the insolvent firm will invest in
a project only when
max[p(vH - C + A - D), Sp(vH - C + A)] + (1-p)S(vL + A - C) > SA
The left side of the inequality is the shareholders' payoff if the firm makes
the investment. The first term is the shareholders' payoff if the project
takes on the high value; the second is the shareholders' payoff if it takes
on the low value. The right side of the inequality is the shareholders'
payoff if the firm does not make the investment.
When the last two inequalities are combined, we find that a loss sharing
regime reduces asset substitution when67
p(vH - C + A - D) > 0 > p(vH- C + A - D) + (1-p)S(vL + A - C) - SA
By subtracting p(vH - C + A - D) from the inequality, and multiplying
through by -1, we get
0 < p(v, - C + A - D) < SA - (1-p)S(vL + A - C)
Thus, bankruptcy sharing decreases asset substitution in the insolvent firm
when the payoff to the shareholders if the project succeeds is less than the
payoff the shareholders receive without investment, less what they would
receive if they undertake the investment and it fails. The higher the
amount that the shareholders receive in bankruptcy, the greater the damping
effect on the shareholders' incentive to engage in asset substitution.
It is clear that bankruptcy sharing has the ability to cause the firm to
forgo investing in projects that decrease social welfare. As the cost of
failure increases (i.e., as vL approaches zero), the shareholders have less
incentive to undertake the investment. Thus, bankruptcy sharing can
prevent a marginally insolvent firm from investing in a project with a large
downside risk and a modest upside risk.
While bankruptcy sharing can decrease asset substitution, at other times
it encourages investment. Because the shareholders receive a percentage
67. In determining the extent to which a bankruptcy sharing regime decreases asset substitution
by an insolvent firm, I want to ignore for the moment those projects that, when they succeed, fail to
return the firm to solvency. I do so because such a situation creates the potential that bankruptcy
sharing will create additional investment rather than decrease the problem of asset substitution. I will
return to this problem when the underinvestment problem is examined. See infra note 68 and
accompanying text.
1994] 1185
Washington University Open Scholarship
1186 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
of the reorganized firm, they have an incentive to maximize firm value
even when the firm remains insolvent. In other words, the other agency
cost associated with debt that can be affected by bankruptcy law,
underinvestment, is decreased by redistribution in bankruptcy.
Underinvestment occurs because the equityholders fail to reap any of the
benefits when the project succeeds. If bankruptcy redistribution is tied to
the value of the firm, shareholders would have an incentive to invest in
projects with a positive net present value.68 In terms of the model, the
firm will not invest in a regime which respects contractual priority when
p(vH - C + A - D) < 0
This failure to invest is inefficient when
PVH+ (1-p)vL - C> 0
In a world where the losses of a failed enterprise are shared under
bankruptcy law, the shareholders would want the firm to undertake this
investment. Under Inequality (3), the shareholders will invest if
Sp(v - C + A) + (1-p)S(vL + A - C) > SA
Dividing both sides of the inequality by S and subtracting A, we get
p(vH - C) + (1-p)(vL - C) > 0
This inequality implies that shareholders of an insolvent firm will undertake
all investments that have a positive net present value. Thus, bankruptcy
sharing solves the underinvestment problem.
Bankruptcy law, to the extent that it does not respect contractual priority,
increases asset substitution by the owners of the solvent firm, while at the
same time reducing asset substitution and underinvestment by the
shareholders in the insolvent firm. While the model in this Part provides
some explanation of how these opposing forces work, it does not allow one
to make a conclusion as to which effect dominates the other. Indeed, it is
probably the case that for some capital structures and choices of investment
opportunities, loss sharing increases the ex ante cost of financial distress,
while for other configurations it decreases such costs.
68. See Rasmussen, supra note 3, at 113-14.
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B. The Effect of Bankruptcy Law on the Costs Associated with the
Separation of Ownership and Control
Bankruptcy law also affects the agency costs associated with the division
of ownership and control. Under current law, a firm's managers control the
decision whether to file a bankruptcy petition. To assess the ex ante effects
of bankruptcy law on managerial behavior, we have to have some sense of
how the managers decide when a petition should be filed. It has been well
documented that managers are often replaced during a bankruptcy
proceeding.69 This does not necessarily mean that managers would be
better off were there no bankruptcy law. Bankruptcy law does not create
financial distress. When a firm encounters financial distress, it may be
inevitable that the managers will lose their jobs-the only question is when.
Thus, the question whether managers prefer the current law as opposed to
some other bankruptcy regime turns on when the managers lose their jobs
under the current system as opposed to when they would be ousted under
a competing regime.
Once the examination is expanded to include the timing of managerial
removal, bankruptcy may not be as unattractive an option as the high rate
of management turnover would otherwise suggest. Managers are not
automatically relieved of their duties immediately following the filing of a
bankruptcy petition. This fact gives managers an incentive to delay the
filing for bankruptcy until the last possible moment when they are in
danger of losing control of the firm outside of bankruptcy. Filing for
bankruptcy at this time would extend their tenure beyond what it otherwise
would have been. Thus, managers may view the option of filing a
bankruptcy petition as a unilateral right to extend their employment
contracts with the firm.
This ability to extend their employment contracts affects the managers'
investment decisions in at least two ways. First, the extra time that
managers stay in control of the firm may reduce the possibility of a
liquidation. It is conceivable that the firm's fortunes may change after the
bankruptcy petition is filed. Thus, if managers weigh both the possibility
of liquidation and the value of the firm if it survives when making
investment decisions, the existence of a bankruptcy proceeding increases
the incentive to undertake a risky investment because bankruptcy lowers the
probability of liquidation. This incentive is limited because it is probably
69. See Gilson, supra note 15, at 247; LoPucki & Whitford, supra note 15, at 723-37.
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unlikely that the extra time bought with a bankruptcy petition will, in and
of itself, return the firm to viability.
The second way in which bankruptcy law affects managerial investment
decisions is through the possibility of reorganization under Chapter 11.
While managers are ordinarily dismissed in a Chapter 11 proceeding, some
managers do in fact retain their positions. Thus, whereas liquidation
ensures that managers end their careers with the distressed firm, reorganiza-
tion creates the possibility that managers will remain with the firm.
Accordingly, managers have an incentive to select projects to which they
are essential in order to avoid removal if the firm encounters financial
difficulty.7" If such investments are not available, if managers have a
positive probability of being retained if the firm files for Chapter 11, and
if the managers' compensation in bankruptcy turns on firm performance,
then managers have an incentive to select projects which maximize firm
value.7
The existence of bankruptcy law thus affects the investment choices that
managers make by giving them an option other than liquidating the firm
under state law. This option affects the magnitude of the agency costs
caused by the existence of debt and the separation of ownership and
control. Both shareholders and managers have an incentive to cause an
insolvent firm to undertake risky projects, some of which will have a
negative net present value. The longer that a firm operates with a capital
structure under which it is insolvent, the larger the cost, through the
undertaking of projects with negative net present values, to social welfare.
Bankruptcy reorganization offers an opportunity to revamp the firm's
capital structure, and thus to reduce the incentive to undertake projects that
are undesirable from a societal perspective. The efficacy of such a
restructuring turns in large part on the time at which a bankruptcy petition
is filed. The sooner the petition is filed after the firm becomes insolvent,
the smaller the expected loss to social welfare.
Managers, however, have little incentive to file for bankruptcy as soon
as the firm becomes insolvent. Prior to filing for bankruptcy, managers
have almost total control over the investment decisions that the firm makes.
Bankruptcy law shifts the locus of the decisionmaking process. Managers
no longer have sole control over the firm's investment decisions. Section
363 of the Bankruptcy Code requires that the debtor obtain court approval
70. See Bebchuk & Picker, supra note 16.
71. See Rose-Ackerman, supra note 16, at 300-03.
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before engaging in any transactions outside of the ordinary course of
business. 2 Even for transactions within the ordinary course of business,
the debtor's creditors can seek a court order limiting the managers' ability
to conduct the affairs of the firm.73  To the extent that the investment
decisions made under the auspices of a bankruptcy judge do not mirror the
decisions that managers would otherwise make, the managers have an
incentive to keep the firm operating outside of bankruptcy.
There are some other incentives for managers to file for bankruptcy in
addition to simply extending the term of their employment contracts. In
the case of a closely held firm, it may be that the firm needs to stay the
collection efforts of small creditors while it renegotiates its loan from its
financier.74 In the case of a publicly held firm, the managers may have
to file bankruptcy in order to force a plan of reorganization on dissenting
bondholders.75 Finally, the managers of a firm may file for bankruptcy
in order to obtain new financing. Bankruptcy law allows the firm to
borrow on a priority basis despite covenants in existing loan agreements
that would prevent such borrowing.7 6 Absent these situations, however,
the managers have little incentive to initiate a bankruptcy proceeding.
Managers thus have little incentive to file for bankruptcy when they can
continue to control the firm outside of bankruptcy. This incentive to delay
filing for bankruptcy often comports with the preferences of the firm's
shareholders. Certainly, if bankruptcy respected contractual priority,
shareholders would want the firm to stay out of bankruptcy as long as
possible because filing for bankruptcy would extinguish their interest.
Even in a world with loss sharing, shareholders may view the opportunity
to engage in risky investments as more valuable than simply taking a
bankruptcy share of the existing assets. This is especially true if the
shareholders believe that the firm still has net present value projects
available. As shown above, the shareholders want the firm to exploit such
projects, even if the projects do not return the firm to solvency, because
such projects increase the expected return to the shareholders once the firm
72. 11 U.S.C. § 363(b)(1) (1988) ("The trustee, after notice and hearing, may use, sell, or lease,
other than in the ordinary course of business, property of the estate.").
73. 11 U.S.C. § 363(c) (1988).
74. Baird & Picker, supra note 65, at 311-12.
75. See John C. Coffee, Jr. & William A. Klein, Bondholder Coercion: The Problem of
Constrained Choice in Debt Tender Qfers and Recapitalization, 58 U. CHi. L. REV. 1207, 1242-51
(1991); Gertner & Scharfstein, supra note 16, at 1211-12.
76. See 11 U.S.C. § 364 (1988). For a criticism of this provision, see George G. Triantis, A
Theory of the Regulation of Debtor-In-Possession Financing, 46 VAND. L. REV. 901 (1993).
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files for bankruptcy.
Finally, the firm's creditors have little incentive to initiate a bankruptcy
proceeding. Once creditors discover that the firm is in financial distress,
they have an incentive to seek payment in full. Bankruptcy law imposes
a pro rata sharing rule, and provides no penalty for those creditors who
have secured repayment prior to the filling of the petition. Moreover, to
file an involuntary bankruptcy petition, a creditor must seek out at least two
other creditors of the firm and convince them to join the petition." Since
creditors can often do better-and rarely do worse-by pursuing their
nonbankruptcy law remedies against the debtor, they have little incentive
to force the firm into an involuntary bankruptcy proceeding.78
For these reasons, bankruptcy filings tend to come too late. The cost of
this delay is the increased possibility that the firm will undertake projects
which have a negative net present value, and thus lead to a decrease in
social welfare.
III. THE Ex ANTE EFFECTS OF PROPOSED BANKRUPTCY REFORMS
Bankruptcy reformers have touted a number of replacements for current
law. I have argued that firms should be allowed, at the time of formation,
to select which bankruptcy regime should govern if the firm encounters
financial distress. Others have offered various proposals which specify the
actual type of rule to govern in the case of financial distress. This section
evaluates the ex ante effect of three proposals of this latter type. These are:
the "automatic cancellation" regime proposed by Bradley and Rosenzweig
and Adler, the auction system suggested by Baird, and the selective stay
offered by Baird and Picker.
A. Automatic Cancellation of Outstanding Equity
The most radical proposal for reforming current bankruptcy law is to
eliminate it. Bradley and Rosenzweig and Adler recommend that Chapter
11 be eliminated and replaced by a system that Bradley and Rosenzweig
term "contingent equity" and Adler calls "chameleon equity."79 Rather
than endorse either of the competing terms, I will refer to their proposals
collectively as "automatic cancellation." This term is appropriate because
77. 11 U.S.C. § 303 (1988).
78. See Douglas G. Baird, The Initiation Problem in Bankruptcy, 11 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 223
(1991) (noting that because all creditors share bankruptcy recovery on a pro rata basis, it is unlikely that
any particular creditor will find it in its best interest to initiate bankruptcy proceedings).
79. See Adler, supra note 2; Bradley & Rosenzweig, supra note 2.
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both systems provide that when a firm defaults on any of its debts, the
firm's equityholders lose their interest in the firm immediately, and the
lowest-priority debtholders become the new equityholders. If after this
conversion the firm is still in default on more senior debt, the new
equityholders have the option of curing this default. If they fail to do so,
their interest is extinguished and the holders of the next most junior debt
become the shareholders. This process is repeated until the firm is no
longer in default on any of its debt."0
The primary justification for this regime is that it would reduce the cost
of bankruptcy proceedings.8  Rather than having long bankruptcy
proceedings that often take years to complete, a regime of automatic
cancellation would transfer ownership immediately upon default. Much has
been written about the relative costs of automatic cancellation and current
law. " The defenders of Chapter 11 have attacked the faith in the market
on which the automatic cancellation proposal is based.83 What has
received less attention is the ex ante effects of automatic cancellation. 4
Bradley and Rosenzweig acknowledge the traditional agency costs
associated with debt in a world of contractual priority." They assert that
these costs would be eliminated by a regime of automatic cancellation.86
While they do not analyze the effects of bankruptcy redistribution on the
agency costs of debt, Bradley and Rosenzweig do assert that their proposal
is better than current law because it respects contractual priority. Adler
80. There are differences between the two proposals. Most notably, Bradley and Rosenzweig,
supra note 2, at 1085 n.98, would not eliminate traditional methods of debt collection whereas Adler
supra note 2, at 332-33, would. Despite this difference, the basic animating thrust of the two propos-
als-that default entails the elimination of the current class of residual owners-remains the same.
81. Adler, supra note 2, at 315-18; Bradley & Rosenzweig, supra note 2, at 1078-79.
82. For attacks on this proposal, see Donald R. Korobkin, The Unwarranted Case Against
Corporate Reorganization: A Reply to Bradley and Rosenzweig, 78 IOWA L. REv. 669, 673 (1993)
(challenging Bradley and Rosenzweig's empirical data, arguing that the proposal would actually cause
efficiency losses, and claiming that they "do not construct a normative case in support of their proposal
that would justify its adoption"); LoPucki, supra note 13; Warren, supra note 4. For a reply to these
attacks, see James W. Bowers, The Fantastic Wisconsylvania Zero-Bureaucratic-Cost School of
Bankruptcy Theory: A Comment, 91 MICH. L. REv. 1773 (1993) (arguing that the high costs involved
in a bureaucratic solution justify resort to a market-based bankruptcy regime).
83. See Korobkin, supra note 82, at 726-27; LoPucki, supra note 13, at 97-110; Warren, supra
note 13, at 379-82; Warren, supra note 4, at 474-77.
84. An exception to this is Skeel, supra note 1, at 483-91, who identifies some of the ex ante costs
of an automatic elimination regime.
85. Bradley & Rosenzweig, supra note 2, at 1052-53.
86. Id. at 1085-88.
87. Id. at 1085.
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is more sanguine about the effects of automatic cancellation. He notes that
the agency cost of debt cannot be eliminated through such a regime. 88
Rather, he makes the more modest claim that such costs are not exacerbat-
ed by his proposal.8 9 Adler has argued elsewhere, however, that bankrupt-
cy law as a general matter should not engage in loss sharing.9"
An automatic cancellation regime does indeed reduce the current costs
of bankruptcy law. The magnitude of the costs of socially inefficient asset
substitution and underinvestment turn on the length of time that bankruptcy
law allows a firm to operate in a condition of financial distress. The longer
a firm can avoid a bankruptcy, the longer those in control of the firm will
have to engage in socially inefficient actions. Moreover, it is probably true
that many insolvent firms will sink deeper into insolvency if they are
allowed to continue with their current capital structure in place. The more
insolvent a firm becomes, the more incentive it has to seek out extremely
risky projects, thus increasing the incentives of those in control of the firm
to engage in asset substitution. Furthermore, the underinvestment problem
is also exacerbated by the growing gap between assets and debt.
Automatic cancellation promises to restructure the firm's capital structure
at an earlier point in time than does current law. Default on any debt
payment leads to a change in capital structure; the existing residual
claimants see their interests extinguished. It is certainly reasonable to
suppose that default would occur under an automatic cancellation regime
earlier than a bankruptcy filing would take place under current law.
However, for reasons discussed below, one cannot assume that a firm
would default in a world of automatic cancellation at the same time that the
firm would default with current bankruptcy law in place. Nevertheless,
default under the former regime would almost certainly occur before default
under the latter. Thus, by shortening the time that the firm operates in a
condition of financial distress, automatic cancellation represents a gain over
current law.
Automatic cancellation also respects contractual priority.9 To the
extent that a firm views bankruptcy sharing as beneficial on the whole, the
firm would have to provide for such sharing by contract. This would
reduce the costs associated with the current law's uncertain and varied
88. Adler, supra note 2, at 33 1.
89. Id.
90. See Adler, supra note 61, at 473-75.
91. Bradley & Rosenzweig, supra note 2, at 1085.
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treatment of the shareholders' interests in bankruptcy.92 This gain in
certainty is a benefit of the automatic cancellation regime.
Despite these gains, the move to an automatic cancellation system would
not be unambiguously beneficial. Automatic cancellation would have
significant ex ante costs. Consider first the problems associated with
investment decisions in a firm in which the managers are the
equityholders-i.e., a firm in which there is no agency cost due to the
separation of ownership and control. Implementing an automatic
cancellation system in this situation would increase the shareholders' focus
on cash flow, a variable which is of little relevance to social welfare.
Under the current legal landscape, managers are basically concerned with
the ultimate payoff of a project. Managers do have to worry about cash
flow either, because a prolonged period of not paying the firm's debts will
ultimately destroy the firm. Nevertheless, they may not be overly
concerned with the prospects of an interrupted cash flow. A lucrative
investment may have an uncertain cash flow. While the shareholders may
be confident that eventually the project will be a success, there may be
some probability that during the course of the project they will not have
sufficient revenues to cover their expenses. If they believe that such
problems will be short-term, they will undertake the project. While they
may technically default on some debt during the course of the project, they
nevertheless expect to come out ahead in the long run.
This calculation changes once we place the shareholders in a world of
automatic cancellation. In such a world, default leads to the elimination of
the shareholders' equity interest. Consequently, shareholders would be
leery of undertaking projects with variable cash flows. As an illustration
of this effect, consider the following situation: our venerable firm
Commodore Corporation once again finds itself with $100 in assets and
$80 in debt. This debt is payable in monthly installments. Recall that
Commodore is still owned and operated by Smith. Smith is presented with
the following project. For $100, Commodore will receive either $150 in
one year or $110, with each outcome being equally likely. Under extant
law, Smith would undertake this project. Smith is faced with trading her
$20 equity stake for a project that will give her interest an expected value
of $50. Moreover, the investment has a positive net present value and thus
92. Of course, one could solve this problem without embracing a regime of automatic cancellation.
See Rasmussen, supra note 3, at 110- 1l (arguing that in choosing a set of insolvency rules from a set
of "standard form" contracts, firms should be allowed to select a regime that explicitly incorporates loss
sharing).
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would increase social welfare.
If Commodore were operating under automatic cancellation, however,
Smith might not make the investment. It may be the case that the cash
flow from the project will not be sufficient to ensure that Commodore
could make its monthly payments to its existing creditors. Because this
risk would result in the elimination of her interest, Smith may not be
willing to undertake the project. Interruptions in cash flow, which do not
necessarily mean that the firm is insolvent, lead to a change in ownership
under a regime of automatic cancellation. Thus, shareholders will shy
away from projects with high variance in cash flow, regardless of the
ultimate payoff from the project.
Of course, the threat of default due to low cash flow exists under extant
law. The difference lies in the consequences that flow from default.
Declaring a default under existing law imposes a large cost on the creditor.
A default may trigger a bankruptcy proceeding. The creditor who declares
a default will not receive payments during the bankruptcy proceeding, and,
if the creditor is unsecured, she will share pro rata with other unsecured
creditors once the proceedings are complete. While default under existing
law may lead the creditor to increase its monitoring of the firm, it does not
necessarily lead to bankruptcy. Shareholders know that declaring default
is costly for a creditor. Thus, they anticipate that their creditors will not
initiate bankruptcy proceedings based on a temporary cash flow problem.
This problem of fluctuating cash flow may not loom large for all firms.
Some firms in stable industries might not be affected by the problem of
interim default because their investments produce sufficiently predictable
returns. These firms may be good candidates for operating under a rule of
automatic cancellation. Yet for other firms, especially firms in cyclical or
high-risk industries, automatic cancellation may exacerbate the
underinvestment problem. Indeed, it may create a significant
underinvestment problem even where the firm is solvent.
Proponents of automatic cancellation might suggest that the problem of
variable cash flows could be reduced either through the issuance of new
equity or the taking on of new debt that matures only after the project
realizes its final value. Neither of these alternatives solves the cash flow
problem. Regarding the issuance of new equity, if the market believes that
there is significant private information about the firm, then it will view the
issuance of new equity as a signal that the firm's current equity is
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overvalued. 93 Thus, the firm's shareholders have an incentive not to seek
financing through the equity market. While at times the gain from the new
project may seem sufficient to overcome the negative effect on stock price,
at other times this negative effect will cause firms to forgo financing of
positive net present value projects through the equity market.94
The firm is left with the possibility of taking on new debt with a
maturity timed so that the debt matures only after the project realizes its
value.95 This financing, however, may not be easy to obtain, because the
firm may not be able to look to the most logical source of funding, a
current lender. Such a lender has a disincentive to lend additional funds.
Default under a rule of automatic cancellation may result in the lender
becoming the owner of the firm, depending on the lender's place in the
firm's capital structure. The lender would thus desire that the firm default
when the lender thinks that it can capture more of the future revenue of the
firm by holding the firm's equity rather than its debt. This incentive would
be greatest in the situation where the firm actually undertook a project and
only then discovered that it faced a cash flow problem which put the
shareholders' interests in jeopardy. Rather than aiding the firm, the
existing lender may attempt to capture the residual ownership for itself by
allowing the firm to default on existing debt.
Thus, in a world of automatic cancellation, a firm seeking to avoid the
problems posed by a project with a variable cash flow may be forced to
seek a new source of funding. Resort to an outside lender, however, raises
problems of its own. First, the transaction costs of seeking a new lender
are probably greater than the costs of going to an existing lender. The
existing lender already has information about the firm that the new lender
would have to acquire. If these transaction costs exceed the expected profit
from the project, the firm will forgo this investment opportunity even
though social welfare would have benefitted from the project.
Forcing the firm to new financing sources decreases social welfare even
if the firm is successful in procuring such financing. Given the fact that
outside lenders have little private information when they make initial loans,
93. See Stewart C. Myers & Nicholas S. Majluf, Corporate Financing and Investment Decisions
Wten Firms Have Information Investors Do Not Have, 13 J. FIN. EcON. 187 (1984).
94. As David Skeel points out, many smaller firms do not even have access to the equity markets.
See Skeel, supra note 1, at 484.
95. See Mark J. Flannery, Asymmetric Information and Risky Debt Maturity Choice, 41 J. FIN. 19
(1986) (arguing that firm will choose short-term debt which matures after favorable information about
the project is expected to become public); Douglas W. Diamond, Debt Maturity Structure and Liquidity
Risk, 106 QJ. ECON 709 (1991) (same).
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other investors glean little information from an initial extension of credit.
By the time of refinancing, however, the lender, through its monitoring of
the firm, may have acquired private information about the firm's future
prospects. A refinancing thus tells the market that the lender, holding this
information, has faith in the firm's future prospects. Conversely, a failure
to refinance sends a strong negative signal.96 To the extent that automatic
cancellation creates incentives for firms to seek outside funding because of
a fear of strategic behavior on the part of its existing lender, the valuable
information communicated by the refinancing decision is lost.97
In sum, neither the issuance of new equity nor the securing of a new
loan completely eliminates the problems raised by the emphasis that
automatic cancellation places on a firm's cash flow. These two sources of
funding do place upper limits on the cost of such emphasis because a firm
will incur the cost of procuring funds through one of these methods if the
available project promises a gain that exceeds such cost. Nevertheless, for
those projects that do not generate profits greater than the costs of such
funding, automatic cancellation will force firms to forgo positive net
present value projects.
Another cost of the automatic cancellation proposal is that it may
exacerbate the asset substitution problem. Most bankruptcy theorists agree
that much of bankruptcy law is designed to combat a common pool
problem. 8  Automatic cancellation increases the magnitude of this
problem. To understand this phenomenon, consider a firm that has little
cash on hand. It faces the prospect of defaulting on its debt, which would
result in the shareholders losing their interest. The firm will thus sell its
most liquid assets while it attempts to turn around the fortunes of the
business. By focusing on the cash flow rather than the ultimate payoff of
96. See Gur Huberman & Charles Kahn, Limited Contract Enforcement and Strategic
Renegotiation, 78 AM. ECON. REV. 471 (1988). Empirical support for this proposition can be found
in Myron B. Slovin et al., Firm Size and the Information Content of Bank Loan Announcements, 16 J.
BANKING & FIN. 1057 (1992) (reporting a positive share price effect for loan renewals in small firms);
Scott L. Lummer & John J. McConnell, Further Evidence on the Bank Lending Process and the Capital
Market Response to Bank Loan Agreements, 25 J. FIN. ECON. 99 (1989) (similar).
97. For other costs associated with a firm obtaining financing from more than one bank, see David
S. Bizer & Peter M. DeMarzo, Sequential Banking, 100 J. POL. ECON. 41 (1992); and Mitchell A.
Petersen & Raghuram G. Rajan, The Benefits of Lending Relationships: Evidence From Small Business
Data, 49 J. FIN. 3 (1994).
98. Douglas Baird and Thomas Jackson are the leading proponents of this view. See DOUGLAS
G. BAIRD & THOMAS H. JACKSON, CASES, PROBLEMS, AND MATERIALS ON BANKRUPTCY 39-55 (2d
ed. 1990); JACKSON, supra note 10, at 7-19; Douglas G. Baird, A World Without Bankruptcy, LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS., Spring 1987, at 173.
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their investment, firms under an automatic cancellation regime have a
greater incentive to engage in piecemeal liquidation than they do under
present law.
Adler's assertion that the elimination of coercive collection rights
eliminates the common pool problem99 does not withstand scrutiny.
Elimination of collection rights does prevent the involuntary liquidation of
the firm through coercive collection measures. Automatic cancellation,
however, increases the incentive to engage in voluntary liquidation. When
default equals a loss of the shareholders' residual claims, the shareholders
will engage in any course of action to prevent such default, including the
piecemeal liquidation of the firm.'00
It is no answer to this objection that the common pool problem in an
automatic cancellation world can be eliminated by contract. As discussed
earlier, contracts cannot fully eliminate the risk of asset substitution.'
Given the realities of limited information regarding future investment
choices, it is impossible to write an ex ante contract specifying the
permissible investment decisions. Nor can this problem be handled by
requiring the lender to approve future transactions. Automatic cancellation,
by promising the lender the residual claim upon default, would give the
lender a strategic incentive to withhold its consent from a proposed
transaction if the lender thought that it would receive a greater return by
holding a residual as opposed to a fixed claim.102 Thus, automatic
cancellation increases the risk of asset substitution.
Another ex ante cost increased by changing to a world of automatic
cancellation is the cost associated with draffing contracts. Under current
law, a firm's failure to meet the covenants in its loan agreement simply
gives the lender the opportunity to declare a default. Declaring a default,
however, is costly to the lender. If the debtor cannot pay its debt in full,
the declaration of default may lead either to liquidation of the business or
to reorganization under Chapter 11. Neither prospect seems attractive to
the lender. A liquidation may not maximize the firm's value, and the
lender may receive less than it would otherwise. A reorganization under
99. See Adler, supra note 20, at 817.
100. This would not be a concern if one were to endorse Professor Bowers' argument that debtors
should liquidate their assets when the firm is insolvent. See Bowers, Bankruptcy Theory, supra note
2; Bowers, Loss Distribution, supra note 2.
101. See discussion supra pp. 1172-73.
102. Cf Skeel, supra note 1, at 485-86 (noting the general incentive for strategic behavior caused
by automatic cancellation).
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Chapter 11 stays payments on past due obligations, t"3 and, if the lender
is not oversecured, stops interest from accruing on the debt.' Moreover,
by declaring default, the lender, like all creditors of the firm, might incur
significant legal expenses in a bankruptcy proceeding. Given these costs
of declaring a default under current law, the lender has to balance the
benefits of future payments from the firm if it does not declare default
against the benefits from default. Thus, it is not surprising that many
lenders do not call defaults even when their debt contracts give them the
option to do so.
This does not imply that the covenants in a debt instrument serve no
purpose-they do. Indeed, covenants give the lender the opportunity to
influence the future decisions of firm. Lenders must decide how closely
they will monitor their debtors. Even if the lender has sufficient leverage
to influence the managers' decisionmaking process, the lender does not
want to be involved in every decision. The lender only wants to use its
influence when the managers are faced with decisions that could affect the
repayment to the lender. These decisions are more likely to occur the
closer the firm comes to insolvency. Covenants alert the lender to the
approach of such a situation and signal to the lender that it has to increase
its monitoring of the firm. Covenants, therefore, operate as a tripwire to
inform the lender that it has to be on guard. 5
All of this changes in a world of automatic cancellation. In such a
world, default equals a change in ownership. This suggests that borrowers
will insist that covenants be narrowly drawn to ensure that default does not
occur at a time when change of ownership is unwarranted. There are three
costs to this change in legal regimes. The first is that more time will be
spent on drafting contracts. Rather than the current situation where there
is little cost associated with having overly broad covenants, a regime of
automatic cancellation would force the contracting parties to write finely-
tuned covenants. Such a drafting process would be more expensive than
the one currently in place. While one can conjure up widely different
estimates as to the magnitude of these costs,0 6 the fact that such costs
103. 11 U.S.C. § 362 (1988 & Supp. 11 1990).
104. 11 U.S.C. § 506 (1988).
105. See Ronald J. Daniels & George G. Triantis, The Role of Debt in American Corporate
Governance (draft).
106. Compare Adler, supra note 12, at 29 (describing cost of contracting as "trivial") with
Korobkin, supra note 82, at 720 ('[T]he administrative and disruption costs of coordinating the
negotiation of a full network of default-contingent contracts are sure to be substantial.").
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exist cannot be denied.
The second cost of automatic cancellation is that the tripwire function of
existing covenants would be lost. New loan contracts could require the
borrower to report information to the lender which would inform the lender
that its repayment may be at risk. Telling this to the lender, however, does
little good unless the lender can then use this information to influence the
behavior of the firm. Current law, by making the declaration of a default
costly, ensures that the lender will threaten to declare a default, even
though it may not actually do so. In the world of automatic cancellation,
there is no cost to the lender associated with declaring default. The lender
either has the right to declare a default (and will do so if it views such
action as increasing its expected return) or it does not. It is difficult to see
how the lender's rights could be calibrated in an automatic cancellation
regime in order to give the lender influence over the decisions of the firm,
and yet protect the shareholders against opportunistic declarations of
default.
The final cost of automatic cancellation regarding the drafting of
covenants is that, given the uncertainties of life, there will be situations
where there is default but the elimination of the firm's outstanding shares
nevertheless is unwarranted. Additionally, there will be situations where
there is not a default even though such elimination should occur. Stated
differently, there will be false positives and false negatives. The problem
of false positives implies that it will be difficult for relational contracting
to continue in a world of automatic cancellation. In a relational contract,
the full obligations of the parties may not be specified at the time of
contracting; the relationship develops over time." 7 Investors will, at
times, take this approach as well.' Exit options determine whether both
parties stay in the relationship. To the extent that these options are more
attractive, the relationship is less likely to proceed. In a world of automatic
cancellation, the exit option for the lender is very attractive---ownership of
the firm. Consequently, the lender is more likely to declare a default.
Therefore, firms may not wish to enter into relational contracts in the first
107. See Charles J. Geotz & Robert E. Scott, Principles of Relational Contracts, 67 VA. L. REV.
1089 (1981); Stewart Macaulay, Non-Contractual Relations in Business: A Preliminary Study, 28 AM.
Soc. REV. 55 (1963); Ian R. Macneil, Contracts: Adjustment of Long-Term Economic Relations Under
Classical, Neoclassical, and Relational Contract Law, 72 Nw. U. L. REv. 854 (1978); Oliver E.
Williamson, Transaction-Cost Economics: The Governance of Contractual Relations, 22 J.L. & ECON
233 (1979).
108. See Ayres & Cramton, supra note 53, at 1034-35.
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instance. To the extent that relational contracts are efficient, this constitutes
a decrease in social welfare.
The lender always has the option not to declare default, but it is hard to
see why the lender would not. Even if it needs the current managers, it can
always negotiate a deal to retain their services."0 9 The lender will
exercise this option when its expected payoff from bargaining with the
managers exceeds its expected payoff if it were not to declare default.
The final ex ante cost associated with a move to a regime of automatic
cancellation is an increase in the agency costs stemming from the
separation of ownership and control. Concern for job security already gives
managers incentives to choose safer investments, even if shareholders
would prefer other, more risky investments. Automatic cancellation would
increase these concerns. Automatic cancellation results in a change in the
party holding the residual claim to the firm. Such a change would
probably lead to an evaluation of the managers' performance. The new
owners of the firm would have to make a decision as to whether the current
managers should stay in place. Accordingly, poor managers would have
a great incentive to avoid default. Changing the ownership requires an
active determination of whether to keep current management. If the new
owners of the firm can distinguish between good and bad management, we
would expect to see bad management avoiding default at any cost. Thus,
they would forgo many worthwhile projects. Managers might shy away
from any project which entails a substantial risk for fear that the new
owners of the firm would not conclude that the managers made the correct
ex ante decision.
A change to a rule of automatic cancellation would thus bring a change
in the ex ante affects of bankruptcy law. It is not clear whether the overall
effect of such changes increases or decreases efficiency. By providing a
trigger which ensures that a firm will not experience an extended period of
financial distress, automatic cancellation reduces the costs of improper asset
substitution and underinvestment. But this quick trigger itself causes
problems. One must be careful in designing nuclear weapons. This added
care and the managers' desire to avoid detonation create ex ante costs. I
find it impossible (or at least imprudent) to assert that I can weigh these
opposing effects in the comfort of my office and declare conclusively
whether automatic cancellation would on balance enhance or lessen the ex
ante cost of financial distress.
109. For the bargaining outcome between a lender who, in effect, owns the firm, and its current
managers, see Baird & Picker, supra note 65, at 341-44.
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B. Auction Regimes
Another prominent suggested reform is to replace Chapter 11 with a
mandatory auction."' First suggested by Douglas Baird, an auction
regime requires that the firm be sold to the highest bidder when it
encounters financial distress. The old owners of the firm-its debtholders
and its equityholders-would then divide the proceeds of the sale amongst
themselves according to the priorities set forth in their contracts."'
The motivation behind the auction regime is to reduce the ex post cost
of financial distress. It would do so in three ways. First, auctions would
provide a market value of the firm by soliciting actual bids for the
firm." 2  Such bids could be on a cash or noncash basis." 3  Current
reorganization law lacks such a valuation mechanism. Rather, it provides
that if the claimants cannot agree on the value of the firm, the value is
determined by a bankruptcy judge."' To the extent that a true market
sale of the firm provides better information about the firm's value than
does a value set by a nonmarket participant, the auction regime would
reduce the cost of financial distress by providing more accurate information
concerning the value of the firm's assets.
Second, the proponents of auction regimes hope that resort to the market
can lead to a savings in the cost of the bankruptcy proceedings.'
5
110. See JACKSON, supra note 10, at 218-24; Philippe Aghion et al., The Economics of Bankruptcy
Reform, 8 J.L. ECON. & ORGANIZATION 523 (1992); Baird, supra note 9; Hansen & Thomas, supra note
10.
111. Of course, some claimants to the firm's assets do not have contracts. These nonconsensual
claimants currently are treated as unsecured creditors who cannot pursue the firm's individual
shareholders. For arguments that they should receive more preferential treatment, see Henry Hansmann
& Reinier Kraakman, Toward Unlimited Shareholder Liabilityfor Corporate Torts, 100 YALE L.J. 1879
(1991); David W. Leebron, Limited Liability. Tort Victims, and Creditors, 91 COLUNI. L. REv. 1565
(1991); Lynn M. LoPucki, The Unsecured Creditors' Bargain, 80 VA. L. REV. (forthcoming 1994);
Christopher M.E. Painter, Note, Tort Creditor Priority in the Secured Credit System: Asbestos Times,
the Worst of Times, 36 STAN. L. REV. 1045 (1984); Rasmussen, supra note 5; Alan Schwartz, Products
Liability Corporate Structure, and Bankruptcy: Toxic Substances and the Remote Risk Relationship,
14 J. LEGAL STUD. 689 (1985).
112. See Baird, supra note 9, at 136-37; JACKSON, supra note 10, at 215-16.
113. The addition of noncash bids has been suggested by Aghion, Hart, and Moore as a way to
solve the financing and lack-of-competition problems that may arise where bids are required to be in
cash only. See Aghion et al., supra note 110, at 527-28, 53 6-37. The addition of such bids requires
the current owners of the firm to vote on which proposal is worth the most. For a discussion of how
this vote would be conducted, see id. at 534-36.
114. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(7), (b) (1988) (requiring the court to make various determinations
regarding the value of creditors' interests under proposed plans of reorganization).
115. See Baird, supra note 9, at 140-41; Hansen & Thomas, supra note 10.
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Bankruptcy proceedings are expensive undertakings. The professional fees
in a large bankruptcy case can run into the tens of millions of dollars."
16
Of course, these fees would not be eliminated entirely in an auction regime.
Some of the disputes that are currently resolved in the bankruptcy forum,
such as priority issues and preference issues, must be decided regardless of
the way in which the firm's assets are distributed. Nevertheless, much time
and expense in bankruptcy is spent formulating a plan of reorganization
that puts both a value on the firm and establishes a new capital structure
for the reorganized entity. The proponents of auctions assert that their
system will reduce these costs. In short, a market sale should be cheaper
to arrange than a negotiated plan of reorganization.
The third and final savings attributed to an auction regime relates to the
future deployment of the firm's assets.' 7  After the firm is sold, the
buyer has the appropriate incentive to decide the future course of the firm.
As the sole owner of the firm, it can assess whether the firm should be
liquidated, kept intact as a going concern, or partially liquidated. Current
bankruptcy law, on the other hand, is biased towards reorganization."'
The end result is that most firms which attempt to reorganize fail." 9
This high failure rate indicates that the bankruptcy process is not making
efficient allocation decisions and those backing an auction system hope that
the buyer of the firm at an auction could do better.
The effect of an auction regime on firm investment policy is in one way
similar to the effect of automatic cancellation. Both regimes replace
current law, which tends to result in a sharing of the losses of the firm,
with a rule that respects contractual priority. To the extent that this change
improves efficiency, it is a benefit of both proposals.
An auction regime also differs from current law in its effect on
managerial behavior. Managers play a significant role in Chapter 11.12
Although many managers are ultimately replaced, the ouster often occurs
116. Steve H. Nickles & Edward S. Adams, Tracing Proceeds to Attorney's Pockets (and the
Dilemma ofPayingfor Bankruptcy), 78 MINN. L. REv. 1079, 1081 (1994). Nickles and Adams report
that Federated Department Stores, Inc. recently spent $121.2 million on professional fees during its
bankruptcy. Johns-Manville also incurred over $100 million in professional costs in its Chapter 11
proceedings. Id.
117. Douglas G. Baird, RevisitingAuctions in Chapter 11, 36 J.L. & ECON. 633, 638-47 (1993).
118. Rasmussen, supra note 3, at 100.
119. Warren, supra note 13, at 373 ("Most observers estimate that about four out of five Chapter
I 1 bankruptcy cases fail before a plan of reorganization can be confirmed."); Robert K. Rasmussen, The
Efficiency of Chapter 11, 8 BANKra. DEv. L.J. 319, 322 (1991) (reporting similar results).
120. David A. Skeel, Jr., Rethinking the Line Between Corporate Law and Corporate Bankruptcy,
72 TEx. L. REv. 471, 535 (1994).
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relatively late in the reorganization process. 12' Assuming that an auction
process is quicker than a reorganization under Chapter 11,122 an auction
regime would accelerate the decision regarding the retention of manage-
ment. This possibility of quicker scrutiny of managerial behavior is a
potential ex ante benefit of a mandatory auction. The extent of this benefit,
however, depends on when an auction would be initiated compared to when
a bankruptcy proceeding would be initiated under current law. As
discussed below, the proponents of mandatory auctions have yet to specify
the way in which the duty to auction off the firm arises. Thus, it is
difficult to conclude how much sooner, if any, review of managerial
performance would occur under an auction regime as compared to current
law.
The auction regime does have another effect on managerial behavior. It
gives managers an incentive to invest in projects which will give them
private information. Managers know that if the firm encounters financial
distress, an auction may result. The managers undoubtedly want to take
steps to ensure that they remain with the firm after the auction. If they
have private information, they can align themselves with one of the groups
bidding for the firm. This alignment would discourage all other bid-
ders."2 Indeed, it was common wisdom on Wall Street that an outside
bidder should not enter a bidding war against a management-led
buyout.'24 Thus, an auction regime would give managers an incentive to
invest in projects about which they have more private information. This
incentive might cause them to pass up projects that have a higher positive
net present value but do not give managers information that they could use
to insinuate themselves with a bidder at auction.
Beyond the respect for contractual priority and the effect on the
incentives for managerial entrenchment, it is difficult to delineate fully the
ex ante effects that an auction regime would have. This is because the
121. See LoPucki & Whitford, supra note 15, at 726.
122. Lawrence Weiss' study of 51 bankruptcy filings revealed that the average time from the filing
of the bankruptcy petition to resolution was 2.5 years. Weiss, supra note 6, at 288. On a similar scale,
Julian R. Franks and Walter N. Torous' study of 30 firms in Chapter II reveals that the average period
of time spent by a firm in Chapter I 1 is four years. Franks & Torous, supra note 7, at 750. These
times greatly exceed the six months suggested by Hansen and Thomas, see supra note 10, or the four
months suggested by Aghion, Hart and Moore for conducting an auction, see Aghion et al., supra note
1 10, at 532-36.
123. See Rasmussen, supra note 3, at 92 n.177.
124. See J. Robert Brown, In Defense of Management Buyouts, 65 TUL. L. REv. 57, 93 n.105
(1990).
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proponents of auction regimes have not articulated the mechanism that
would trigger the sale of the company.'25 As in the case of automatic
cancellation, the timing of the insolvency procedure in large measure
dictates the effects that the insolvency will have on firm behavior. The
longer an insolvency regime allows a firm to operate while in financial
distress, the greater the incentives it produces to engage in inefficient asset
substitution and underinvestment. Therefore, before adopting an auction
regime, the crafter of insolvency rules must select a triggering mechanism
for the auction and then assess its ex ante effects.
126
C. Selective Stay
Less radical changes to current bankruptcy law have been proposed as
well. One alternative, proposed by Baird and Picker, would operate in the
case of a closely held corporation run by its shareholders and would stay
the actions of most creditors, with the notable exception of the major
financing creditor.'27 Under this legal regime, the decision whether to
continue the business with current management depends on the outcome of
the negotiations between the financing creditor and the managers. If the
creditor believes that the liquidation value of the firm exceeds its going-
concern value, it can foreclose without the consent of the managers or the
bankruptcy court. If the financing creditor believes that the firm should
remain intact, it must reach an agreement with the current managers. Such
an agreement would give the managers a share of the reorganized firm.'28
One ex ante benefit of this proposal is that it may lead to more efficient
monitoring of the firm's behavior outside of bankruptcy. The financing
creditor is assured that if its monitoring leads it to conclude that the firm
should be liquidated, it can act on its conclusion immediately. Under
current law, the managers of the firm can stop a creditor from liquidating
the firnm by filing a bankruptcy petition.'29 Thus, the creditor knows that
even if it concludes that a firm should be liquidated, it cannot readily turn
this belief into action. At most, it can precipitate the filing of a bankruptcy
petition. Thus, under existing law there is less incentive to monitor the
125. See generally Aghion et al., supra note 110; Baird, supra note 9.
126. For a discussion of who should craft a firm's insolvency rules, see infra Part IV.
127. See generally Baird & Picker, supra note 65.
128. The agreement that the parties would reach is analyzed in Baird & Picker, supra note 65, at
329-40.
129. 11 U.S.C. § 362 (1988 & Supp. II 1990) (providing that the commencement of a bankruptcy
case stays all actions to collect debts).
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firm than there would be under the selective stay. 30
Baird and Picker have shown that if the value of the firm with its current
managers is greater than the value of the firm without such managers, and
if the liquidation value of the firm is substantial, the parties under the
selective stay will reach an agreement to continue the business under which
the creditor receives the liquidation value of the assets and the managers
received all of the going-concern surplus. 3' On the other hand, if the
liquidation value of the assets is relatively small, the creditor and the
managers will split the going-concern value of the firm in a way which
depends on the relative discount rates of each party.
3 2
This division of the value of the firm will decrease the underinvestment
problem. If a firm is insolvent-which is a necessary condition for the
traditional underinvestment problem-and still has substantial assets, the
firm's managers would have an incentive to undertake all investments that
have a positive net present value. Since the creditor's share depends upon
the liquidation value of the firm's assets, to the extent that the investment
requires use of these assets, the creditor in effect pays for the investment.
So long as part of the payoff from the investment increases the overall
value of firm without increasing the liquidation value of the firm's assets
to an equal extent, the managers will capture this difference.
Indeed, there is a broader point. Under the selective stay model, the
managers in certain firms-those firms that have substantial liquidation
value-have an incentive to invest in projects which depend heavily on
their skills. To the extent that firm value exceeds liquidation value, the
managers get to keep this surplus. Thus, while the selective stay regime
may alleviate the underinvestment problem, it probably would increase the
problem of asset substitution. The managers have an incentive to turn
assets with a high liquidation value into assets with values more dependent
on the managers' skills. Stated differently, the managers would have an
incentive to turn non-firm-specific assets into firm-specific assets. This
incentive does not depend on whether the new assets have a greater net
present value than the old assets. Thus, the problem of inefficient asset
substitution arises. Whether the costs associated with increased asset
substitution exceed the gains attributable to the elimination of the
underinvestment problem is a determination that cannot be made in the
130. This cost is capped by the cost that would result if the firm had an all-equity capital structure.
See Baird, supra note 18.
131. Baird & Picker, supra note 65, at 340-42.
132. Id.
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abstract.
More socially efficient results obtain where the current liquidation value
of the assets is low. In this situation, the parties will each retain shares of
the reorganized firm based on the bargain that they reach. Assuming that
both the creditor and the managers have the same discount rate, they will
split the value of the firm equally. This being the case, the managers now
have the incentive to invest in all positive net present value projects and to
avoid most negative net present value projects. The managers will invest
in all positive net present value projects because they will capture a large
portion of the increase in firm value. They will, as a general matter, avoid
negative net present value projects because such projects decrease their
expected share of the reorganized company. This suggests that the
selective stay may be most desirable in firms with low liquidation values
and high human capital assets.
None of the touted replacements thus represent a clear efficiency gain
over Chapter 11 in terms of ex ante effects for all firms. The proposals for
both automatic cancellation and mandatory auctions respect contractual
priority, but it is unclear whether this respect creates better investment
incentives than a regime that incorporates loss sharing. Automatic
cancellation has the potential to reduce the time during which the firm
experiences financial distress, but the threat of this quick change in the
firm's capital structure creates new ex ante costs. Much of the ex ante
effect of mandatory auctions cannot be assessed without knowledge of what
event triggers the auction. The selective stay holds out great hope for
reducing the incentives for inefficient investment in some small firms, but
is clearly not an appropriate insolvency regime for all firms. Thus, while
the various proposals for bankruptcy reform have differing ex ante effects,
none can be said to be clearly superior to current law in all respects.
IV. CHOOSING THE OPTIMAL SET OF INSOLVENCY RULES
What are we to do with this mess? The ex ante effects generated by
Chapter 11 and its proposed replacements do not lend themselves to easy
characterization. There is no clear efficiency gain, at least from an ex ante
perspective, of shifting from current law to any of the proposed major
reforms. One cannot in the abstract come up with a rank ordering of the
various competing regimes based on the way in which they will affect firm
investment prior to the bankruptcy filing. Given that the various proposed
reforms are not clearly superior to current law, the defenders of the status
quo might assert that such law is entitled to a presumption of remaining in
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place, and that the proposed reforms have failed to overcome that
presumption.
This argument should be rejected. It fails to ask the crucial question of
which institution should select the legal rules that govern the firm when it
encounters financial distress. 3 Before deciding what to do with the
information regarding the ex ante effects of various bankruptcy proposals,
we have to decide which institution is best able to process this information
in a useful fashion. The goal is to pick the institution which can best
minimize the sum of the deadweight cost to society arising from the
substantive rule itself and the transaction costs of implementing the rule.
There are three possible candidates for the role of selecting the governing
insolvency rules: the bankruptcy court, Congress, or the shareholders of
the firm itself. 4
The bankruptcy court is the institution least suited to the role of selecting
insolvency rules. One could imagine a world where, after a firm filed for
bankruptcy, the bankruptcy court would decide which set of insolvency
rules would apply. It is easy to see why no one has suggested such a
bankruptcy regime. First, it deprives the parties of certainty-prior to
bankruptcy they are unsure as to what will happen if the firm encounters
financial distress. This uncertainty would discourage lending to firms that
have a significant chance of encountering financial distress. Second,
bankruptcy judges only see those cases which actually end up before them.
They do not see firms that do not encounter financial distress or firms that
do have financial problems but are able to conclude a workout outside of
bankruptcy. Bankruptcy judges cannot assess the effect that their decisions
have on firms that they never see.'35 This lack of certainty and inability
to assess the results of their decisions disqualify bankruptcy courts from
being the institution that should select insolvency rules.
The unstated premise of those who assert that Chapter 11 should be
133. On the general question of institutional choice, see Neil Komesar, In Search of a General
Approach to Legal Analysis: A Comparative Institutional Alternative, 79 MICH. L. REv. 1350 (1981).
See also ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: How NEIGHBORS SEIrLE THEIR DISPUTES
242-43 (1991).
134. David Skeel has argued that state legislatures should select the governing insolvency rules for
corporate bankruptcies. See Skeel, supra note 120, at 475. He asserts that states have better incentives
to adopt efficient laws than does Congress. Id. at 517-20. To the extent that one accepts Skeel's
argument, one would have state legislatures, as opposed to Congress, select the governing bankruptcy
regime. The broader question, which is addressed in the text, is whether bankruptcy rules should be
selected by a court, a legislature, or private parties. Which legislature would do the selecting does not
affect the argument offered in the text.
135. See Rasmussen, supra note 5.
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retained or only modestly amended is that Congress is best positioned to
select insolvency rules. Legislative determinations of insolvency rules
probably do minimize the transaction costs associated with the selection
procedure. Once Congress identifies the governing rules, the parties
affected by these rules do not have to spend any resources drafting their
own rules to govern financial distress and disseminating these rules to all
those who do business with the firm. Mandatory rules have the virtue of
removing the subject at issue from the bargaining table, and thus, reducing
the amount of societal resources devoted to bargaining.
What congressionally mandated insolvency rules gain in reduction of
transaction costs, however, they lose in terms of the efficiency of the rules
themselves. Congress, by its nature, acts without regard to any specific
firm. Under current law, Congress has adopted a single bankruptcy regime
for all firms that wish to reorganize. Given the diversity in the nature of
firms, it is highly unlikely that one bankruptcy regime will meet the needs
of all firms.'36 Certainly, Congress could enact a number of different
bankruptcy regimes, each one designed for a different type of firm. Indeed,
the 1898 Bankruptcy Act, which the current Bankruptcy Code replaced, had
two separate procedures for dealing with reorganizations.'37 Similarly,
Congress recently considered, but did not enact, a proposal to add a new
chapter designed to handle the reorganization of small businesses.' The
problem with these proposals is that Congress still must decide which firms
should be relegated to which type of insolvency proceeding. Even
assuming that Congress attempted to promote efficiency in making such
selections,139 it is unlikely, given the diversity of firms, that it could craft
a set of rules which correctly assign each firm to the most efficient set of
bankruptcy procedures for that firm. The analysis in the prior two Parts of
this Article shows that there are important ex ante effects of both current
bankruptcy law and the various reform proposals. Yet, it would be
impossible to craft a set of rules to sort all firms so that each firm resided
in the most efficient bankruptcy system.
136. Id. at 63.
137. See Bankruptcy Act of 1898, 30 Stat. 544 (1898), amended by Ch. X, 52 Stat. 840 (1938)
(repealed 1978).
138. For a description and analysis of the proposed "Chapter 10," see Dan J. Schulman, Business
Reorganizations Under Proposed Senate Bill 540, 3 J. BANKR. L. & PRAC. 265 (1994). This proposal
was not included in the final bankruptcy bill enacted by Congress this year. H.R. 5112, 103d Cong.,
2d Sess. (1994).
139. As to the forces that suggest that Congress does not act efficiently in the bankruptcy area, see
Adler, supra note 2, at 341-46; Rasmussen, supra note 3, at 88-89; Skeel, supra note 1, at 494-509.
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This leaves the third institution which could craft insolvency rules-the
market, represented in this case by the shareholders of the firm. Allowing
private parties to select the appropriate set of bankruptcy rules provides a
higher probability that each firm is governed by the set of rules that best
fits the needs of that firm. The firm's shareholders bear the cost of
inefficient insolvency rules. 14  Thus, they have the incentive to select the
insolvency rules that best fit the needs of their firm. Moreover, sharehold-
ers have better information about their firm and their taste for risk than any
other party. Consequently, they are more likely to select the appropriate
rules for their firm than is either a legislature or a bankruptcy court.
Unfortunately, having the best incentives does not imply that mistakes
will not be made; they will. But it does ensure that there will be fewer
mistakes than there would be if another institution were to make the
decision. Indeed, contract scholars long ago recognized this very point.
The debate over whether courts, through the unconscionability doctrine, or
the federal and state governments, through their regulatory powers, should
intervene to protect one party to a contract was in large part a debate over
institutional competence. While most recognize that private parties
sometimes make mistakes, the consensus is that a well-functioning market
protects parties more effectively than either legislatures or courts. There
is little reason to expect that the lessons learned from that debate would not
extend to the bankruptcy context. 4 '
Private contracting, however, is no panacea. While it holds out the best
possibility for choosing bankruptcy rules that best suit the needs of
individual firms, it also creates greater transaction costs than would exist
under a system of legislatively determined bankruptcy rules. If bankruptcy
law were relegated purely to private contracting, private parties would face
two sources of transaction costs. The first would be the cost of designing
the set of insolvency rules that would govern the firm's financial distress.
The second would be the cost of communicating the rules that are drafted
to the relevant parties. If the parties view the costs of financial distress,
discounted to present value, as relatively low (not an implausible assump-
140. See Rasmussen, supra note 3, at 57-65.
141. If anything, the case for allowing shareholders to select their own set of insolvency rules is
stronger than the case for allowing consumers to make their own choices. Shareholders are more likely
to receive legal advice when incorporating the firm than are consumers entering into a simple contract.
Moreover, there is little reason to fear that a lender will have monopoly power over potential borrowers.
Thus, the concerns that gave rise to the consumer protection movement do not appear to be present
when a firm seeks financing.
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tion given that not all firms fail, and those that will fail may not do so for
many years), then it may be that the shareholders of any single firm would
not have the incentives to craft an optimal set of bankruptcy rules. In such
a situation, the shareholders may be content to live with whatever default
rule the law provides.
It is possible, however, to combine the legislature's ability to economize
on transaction costs with the private parties' ability to determine which set
of rules best serves their needs. Congress could craft a number of varied
bankruptcy regimes but allow the shareholders to select which regime
would govern their firm. 42 While the shareholders would be free to
decline the options offered by Congress and craft their own set of
insolvency rules, many firms would prefer not to invest the resources in
drafting and publicizing their own set of insolvency rules. They would
instead prefer to rely on what are, in essence, standard form contracts.
Firms would thus garner the benefits of choosing the rule that best suits
their needs while taking advantage of the legislature's ability to economize
on transaction costs.
V. CONCLUSION
Bankruptcy law affects the behavior of firms well before they file a
bankruptcy petition. These effects, and the way they would be changed by
various proposed reforms of bankruptcy law, are an important part of the
debate over the desirability of Chapter 11. Examination reveals, however,
142. See Rasmussen, supra note 3. One interesting issue is whether Chapter I I should be included
on the menu. One might be tempted to say that there is little cost to such inclusion. After all, if a firm
does not like Chapter 11, it can simply choose another rule. But matters may not be that simple. One
could argue that Chapter I I can be analogized to an industry-wide standard because it is the set of
insolvency rules under which everyone currently operates. The other choices on the menu may then
be viewed as competing standards. Given that there is in some sense an "installed base" of Chapter
11, the cost of being the first to switch to a new standard may impede such switching even if the new
standard better promotes overall welfare. A sampling of the literature on the problems associated with
"network externalities" includes Michael L. Katz & Carl Shapiro, Network Externalities, Competition,
and Compatibility, 75 AM. ECON. REv. 424 (1985); Brian Arthur, Competing Technologies and Lock-in
by Historical Events, 99 ECON. J. 116 (1989); Stanley M. Besen & Joseph Farrell, Choosing How to
Compete: Strategies and Tactics in Standardization, J. ECON. PERSP., Spring, 1994, at 117 (1994); and
Joseph Farrell & Garth Saloner, Standardization, Compatibility, and Innovation, 16 RAND J. ECON. 70
(1985). For an application of the network externality literature to the corporate law context, see
Michael Klausner, Corporations, Corporate Law and Networks of Contracts (draft).
If there are welfare gains from the switch to a new standard, however, it may be that law firms
would be willing to invest the cost to learn the options on the menu in order to increase the market for
their services. Thus, while the matter is not free from doubt, the better choice as things now stand is
to include Chapter 1 I.
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that none of the suggested bankruptcy laws, including the current system,
lowers the agency costs attributable to debt and the separation of ownership
and control for all firms. For some firms, one set of insolvency rules may
lessen these costs, yet for other firms, a different set may be optimal.
This heterogeneity among firms suggests that Congress should repeal
existing law and replace it with a menu of bankruptcy options. The
dazzling array of different effects suggests that what is right for one firm
may not be right for another. Moreover, the cost of inefficient bankruptcy
rules is borne by the shareholders. Thus, shareholders have the appropriate
incentives to select a bankruptcy regime that minimizes the potential future
cost to their firm of financial distress. Allowing the parties to sort
themselves creates a gain over both current law and any attempt by a
legislature to do such sorting on its own.
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